CHAPTER IV THE DECISIVE BATTLE

The next five days were occupied in securing the necessary concentration of troops for the main attack on Sharia and Hareira, and in developing the scanty water supply, and organising water convoys to enable these troops to subsist in the barren country in which they were to operate.

The Anzac Division, pushing northwards on the 2nd, astride the Hebron road and on the right of the 53rd Division, encountered increasing resistance, and made but slow progress. Very hard fighting continued during the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, in the course of which it became clear that the enemy had concentrated practically the whole of his available reserves in this area. The 19th Turkish Division, the remains of the 27th (the late garrison of Beersheba), and part of the 16th Division, together with the whole of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were identified in this fighting round Ain Kohleh and Tel Khuweilfeh.

In thus throwing the whole of their available reserves against our extreme right flank, the Turks were committed to a bold but dangerous course. It was evident that they hoped to compel the British Commander-in-Chief to detach part of his force to meet this counter-attack. Had they succeeded in involving any considerable portion of our army in the difficult, waterless country around Tel Khuweilfeh, it is probable that our main force would have[Pg 39] been so weakened as to be unable to attack the Sharia and Hareira positions with any chance of success. Such a failure might well have brought the whole of our offensive to a standstill, and enabled the Turks to establish themselves on a new line from Sharia to the Hebron road.

On the other hand, should we succeed in holding the enemy's counterstroke without having to weaken our main striking force, he ran the risk of finding his reserves immobilised at the critical moment, and thus prevented from rendering any assistance to the garrisons of Sharia and Hareira when those places were attacked. This, in fact, was exactly what happened. General Allenby refused to be drawn to the east, and, relying on the Anzac and 53rd Divisions to hold the enemy in check at Tel Khuweilfeh, proceeded resolutely with his preparations for the assault on the left flank of the main Turkish position.

On the 2nd of November the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade, less one regiment, rejoined the Australian Mounted Division, and the 5th and 7th Mounted Brigades were attached to the Anzac Division. The 5th Brigade remained in Beersheba, but the 7th joined the Anzac Division, and had a stiff day's fighting, culminating in the seizing of the hill of Ras el Nukb, near Tel Khuweilfeh, to which the enemy attached great importance, and which he defended most stubbornly. The brigade withdrew from Ras el Nukb at nightfall, as it was too much in advance of our general line to be held during the night. The Anzac Division occupied a line from about Bir el Nettar to Deir el Hawa, and thence south-west to Khurbet el Likiye, whence the Camel Corps Brigade carried on the line to the right of the 53rd Division near Toweil Abu Jerwal.

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Next day the 53rd Division attacked the heights of Tel Khuweilfeh, but met with strong resistance from the enemy, and by evening had gained only a precarious footing on the south-western spur of the hill. The cavalry were engaged throughout the day on the right of the 53rd, towards Dhahariyeh and east of Tel Khuweilfeh.

The fighting continued day and night during the 4th and 5th. As the time passed, and our preparations for the main attack neared completion, the enemy, who must by this time have realised our intention, flung his reserves more and more recklessly against our weak right flank, in a desperate endeavour to drive it in. He completely failed in his effort, and our troops, after three days and nights of incessant fighting, short of food and water, and, at one time, perilously short of ammunition, not only held their own, but drove back the Turks inch by inch, and at last, on the morning of November 6th, the 53rd Division captured the ridge of Tel Khuweilfeh. One magnificent counter-attack the enemy made, which drove our men off the ridge again, but it was a last despairing effort. His exhausted troops were quickly dislodged from the position, and the ridge remained in our hands.

The fine fighting and grim endurance of the 53rd and the Anzac Mounted Divisions during these three days played a vital part in the success of the subsequent operations, by engaging the enemy's principal reserves and defeating his counterstroke, thus permitting our concentration for the main attack to proceed unhindered. The cavalry had an especially hard time. The country was quite unsuited for mounted work, and so all their fighting was done on foot. But it was necessary to keep their horses always near them in order to be in a position to[Pg 41] pursue the enemy at once, should he give way and endeavour to withdraw. Water was very scarce, and the few known wells were quite inadequate for the requirements of the division.

When our troops had first entered this region there were a number of pools in the wadis, left by the thunderstorm which had broken a few days before the operations began, but these rapidly dried up, and, by the morning of the 5th of November, had finally given out. The horses then had to be sent back to Beersheba to water. From the Dhahariyeh area to Beersheba and back again is twenty-eight miles, and a record of the movements between these two places from the 3rd to the 6th of November will give some idea of the extra work entailed on horses and men by the lack of water.

On the 3rd of November the 1st Brigade was relieved by the 5th, and marched back to Beersheba to water, their horses having then been thirty hours without a drink. On the 4th the New Zealanders relieved the 5th Brigade at Ras el Nukb for the same purpose. This brigade had also been thirty hours without water. On the 5th the New Zealanders remained at Ras el Nukb, since there was no brigade available to relieve them, but sent all their horses back to Beersheba during the night. They had then been unwatered for forty-eight hours. On the 6th it was the turn of the 2nd Brigade to make the weary pilgrimage to Abraham's Well.

Thus the horses of each of these brigades had only one really good drink during the four days they were in this area. Some of them, it is true, picked up a little water here and there, generally at night. Indeed many units of the division spent every night in a search for water that too often proved fruitless, and only added to the fatigue of men and horses.[Pg 42] The 7th Brigade found enough water on the east of the line to eke out a bare existence for its horses.

During all this period the cavalry were continually engaged with the enemy, and some of the fighting was severe. The Turks assaulted Ras el Nukb repeatedly on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of November. This hill was held in turn by the 7th Brigade, which had captured it in the first instance, the 1st, 5th and New Zealand Brigades, and each of these had to withstand one or more attacks.

By the evening of the 5th of November the 20th Corps was in readiness for the assault on the Sharia-Hareira positions, which was to complete the defeat of the Turks.

The situation was now slightly different from what had been expected. The action of the enemy in counter-attacking against our right flank had resulted in prolonging his line to the east. The coming operations, therefore, consisted in an attempt to pierce his line at Sharia, instead of an attack against his left flank, as had been anticipated. In order to secure the troops engaged in this attempt from molestation by the considerable body of enemy about El Dhahariyeh, a force, known as Barrow's Detachment,[9] was formed to protect our right flank. This force consisted of the 53rd Division, the New Zealand Mounted Brigade, and the Camel Corps Brigade, with the Yeomanry Division, which crossed over to the right of our line on the night of the 4th to join the detachment. All the horses of this division had to be sent back to Beersheba, fifteen miles away, to water. The Australian Mounted Division had left Beersheba on the 4th, having nearly exhausted all the water there, and moved to[Pg 43] Karm, taking up a line of observation from the Wadi Hanafish to Hiseia.

There was now a gap some twelve miles wide between the 21st Corps at Gaza and the 20th Corps opposite Sharia, and it was possible, though not very probable, that the enemy might attempt to throw his cavalry through this gap in an endeavour to raid our communications. It was part of the task of the Australian Mounted Division to frustrate any such attempt.

At dawn on the 6th November the 10th, 60th, and 74th Divisions attacked the south-eastern portion of the Hareira defences, known as the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems. The 74th, after some of the hardest fighting of a day of hard fighting, succeeded in capturing all its objectives by half-past one. The 10th and 60th Divisions, which were attacking on the left of the 74th, had farther to go, and the heavy wire of the main Kauwukah position had to be methodically cut before the attack could be launched. To reach its objectives, the 10th (Irish) Division had to cross a perfectly flat, open plain, two miles wide, which was swept from end to end by the fire of enemy guns of all calibres, and by machine guns and rifles. The advance of this grand division, marching across the fire-swept plain as steadily as though on parade, was a sight that will never be forgotten by those who were privileged to see it.

By half-past two in the afternoon both the 10th and the 60th Divisions had penetrated the enemy lines, and captured the whole of the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems. The 60th Division reached Sharia station, but was unable to cross the Wadi Sharia to capture the hill of Tel el Sharia that night. This hill, together with the main redoubts of Hareira, remained, therefore, for the next day's task.

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During the night the Australian Mounted Division marched to a concealed position three miles south-west of Sharia, in readiness for the expected break-through. The 5th Mounted Brigade rejoined the division here, and the 7th went into Corps Reserve.

The r?le of the cavalry during the next few days was to sweep across the plain to the north-west, in order to cut off or pursue the retiring enemy troops, after they had been driven out of their positions from Sharia to the sea. In pursuance of this r?le, the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions were ordered to push forward, as soon as the way was clear, the Anzac Division, on the right of the movement, being directed to keep well in advance, so as to outflank any enemy opposition. The 60th Division was to move in support of the cavalry on the left flank, and the Australian Mounted Division, in the centre, was to maintain touch with the Anzacs and the 60th. The Yeomanry Division would remain, at first, with the 53rd Division, to carry out a special task.

Water for the cavalry horses was an essential preliminary to the pursuit of the enemy. The country north of Sharia was sparsely populated, and the few wells to be found there were of great depth and poor supply. The only water sources on our front which were believed to be capable of supplying the large number of horses we had were at Bir Jemameh, where there was reported to be a good well with a steam pumping plant, and at Tel el Nejile and Huj. The Anzac Division was accordingly directed on the two first-named places, and the Australian Division on Huj. The former division had only two brigades with it, having left the New Zealand Brigade in the Jurat el Mikreh, under the orders of the 53rd Division.

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The attack of our infantry was resumed early on the 7th, and the 10th Division stormed the Hareira positions in the morning. The 60th Division secured the hill of Tel el Sharia in the early afternoon, but the enemy succeeded in withdrawing in good order to a long ridge on the north side of and overlooking the Wadi Sharia, where he held out all the afternoon. The approach to this ridge was up a long, bare slope, devoid of cover, and the enemy made full use of his many machine guns and of his heavy artillery.[10]

At four o'clock in the afternoon, the 4th A.L.H. Brigade, supported by two batteries of the Australian Mounted Division, was sent across the Wadi Sharia dismounted, in order to cover the concentration of the 60th Division for a final assault. When the position was carried, just before dark, it took some time to disengage this brigade, and the division was consequently unable to move farther that night. The 3rd A.L.H. and the 5th Mounted Brigades, however, were sent round the right flank of the 60th Division, to endeavour to make a mounted attack on the retreating enemy. They had to ride two miles to the east, before a possible crossing place over the wadi was found, and it was then too late to do anything more. Two regiments of the 5th Brigade did indeed draw swords, and canter out into the open north of the wadi, but darkness fell before they were able to close with the enemy.

The Anzac Mounted Division, more fortunate, had been able to push through the gap formed in the enemy's line, by the driving in of his inner left flank, and advanced on its first objective, the station of[Pg 46] Umm el Ameidat on the Junction Station-Beersheba line, where the enemy had a large supply and ammunition depot. The 1st Brigade, in the lead, moved forward in open formation over the plain, being severely shelled by enemy guns from the west and north-west.

About 11 A.M. the advanced troops were fired at on approaching the station. The vanguard regiment at once closed up and charged, capturing the place after a sharp fight, with about 400 prisoners and a great quantity of ammunition and stores. Reconnaissances pushed out at once to the north and east located a strong enemy rearguard in position on the hill of Tel Abu Dilakh. The 2nd Brigade was despatched to the assistance of the 1st, and the two brigades attacked the hill dismounted. The position was taken just before dark, after severe lighting, but our troops were then heavily shelled on the hill, and the Turkish rearguard only retired a short distance to the ridges north of the position. The division held a battle outpost line for the night from Abu Dilakh to a point about two miles east of the railway.

Scouts of the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade succeeded in gaining touch with the Anzac Division about Abu Dilakh late at night. No water was obtainable for the horses of either division.

There had been an extraordinary instance in the morning of 'counting chickens before they are hatched.' After the attack on Beersheba, the heavy wagon échelons of the cavalry ammunition columns had been withdrawn from their divisions, brigaded together, and placed under the direct command of the Corps. The intention was to direct this Corps column each day on a pre-arranged place, and notify its location to the divisional ammunition columns,[Pg 48] which could then send their light, limbered wagons to that place to refill. The spot chosen for the 7th of November was Tel el Sharia, and the column was directed to report there at 11 A.M. The order was actually issued on the morning of the 6th, the staff officer who gave it believing that the place would be in our hands that night, whereas it was not taken till the following afternoon. Accordingly, about nine o'clock on the morning of the 7th, the ammunition column was seen marching steadily towards the enemy, to the admiration of the spectators, and the no small consternation of the staff officer who had given the order!

map

Diagram illustrating the situation on the evening of November the 7th.

Fortunately the commander of the column noticed, as he explained afterwards, that 'there seemed to be something wrong at Tel el Sharia, so he thought he had better go to ground with the column till he could find out who the beggars on the hill really were.'

While the 20th Corps was thus occupied driving in the enemy's left flank, the 21st Corps, in the coastal area, was administering the coup de grace to Gaza. The bombardment had been resumed on the 3rd, and had continued for the following three days with growing intensity. On the 5th and 6th the Navy joined in the fight, and plastered the town with shells of heavy calibre. During the night of the 6th a series of attacks carried out by our infantry on the enemy positions met with only half-hearted resistance, and, when a general advance was made on the morning of the 7th, it was found that the Turks had retired during the night.

The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade at once went forward, riding through the ruins of Gaza, and reached Beit Hanun, just south of the Wadi Hesi, early in the afternoon. At the same time two brigades of the 52nd Division made their way along[Pg 49] the seashore under cover of the cliffs, and seized the high ground north of the Wadi Hesi, in the face of strong resistance from the enemy.

enemy

Turkish Cavalry near Sharia.
(From an enemy photograph.)

battery

A Turkish cavalry machine-gun battery in action near Sharia.
(From an enemy photograph.)

This rapid move of the 52nd Division was of the greatest value to us. The Turks had constructed a strong, defensive line just north of the wadi, and had evidently hoped, in the event of being driven out of Gaza, to be able to rally on this line, and hold up our farther advance. Some of our cavalry subsequently took prisoner the engineer officer who had superintended the making of this line. He expressed keen disappointment that the Turks had been driven out of it before they had had time to settle down, and declared that, had they got there a few hours sooner, all our operations would have come to a standstill. No doubt he was biassed in favour of his own handiwork, but there is little doubt that the Turks would, at the least, have been able to organise their retreat, had they succeeded in holding this line even for a short time. Now, however, driven out of their last entrenched position, and with their forces disorganised and split into two widely separated groups, they were compelled to retreat over open country, pursued by a vigorous and successful enemy.
FOOTNOTES:

[9] From its commander, Major-General Sir G. de S. Barrow, G.O.C. of the Yeomanry Division.

[10] On one occasion, the Huns, with characteristic ferocity, deliberately turned their heavy artillery on to a convoy of ambulance camels bearing wounded out of the fight, and utterly destroyed it.