CHAPTER IX MOUNTAIN WARFARE

The advance was resumed on the 18th of November. During the preceding two days there had been no movement of importance on the part of our forces. The 22nd Mounted Brigade had located the Turkish rearguard at Amwas on the 16th, and had then cleared the foothill country as far as Ramleh, without meeting any more of the enemy. On the same day the 8th Mounted Brigade had entered Ludd without opposition, rounding up a few prisoners there. The Anzac Division remained in observation of the northern group of the Turkish forces, along the Nahr el Auja, and the Australian Mounted Division moved close to Amwas, in preparation for the advance up the Jerusalem road.

In order to avoid fighting in or near the Holy Places, the Commander-in-Chief determined to try and isolate Jerusalem completely. In order to do this it was necessary to gain possession of the only road which traverses the Jud?an Range from north to south, between Nablus and Jerusalem.

The Yeomanry Division was accordingly directed to move by the old Roman road from Ludd, through Berfilya and Beit Ur el Tahta, to Bire, pushing through the mountains as quickly as possible. The two available infantry divisions were to advance up the Jerusalem road, preceded by two brigades of the Australian Mounted Division, to about Kuryet el Enab, whence they were to strike north-eastwards[Pg 102] towards the Nablus road. The 5th Mounted Brigade, moving up the Wadi Surar, would protect the right flank of the infantry during their advance. Finally the 53rd Division, now about Hebron, was to press on from that place, and secure the Jericho road, east of Jerusalem.

The city would thus be cut off from all sources of reinforcement and supply, and, it was hoped, would capitulate without further bloodshed.

On the morning of the 18th the Australian Mounted Division found a force of the enemy entrenched on the hill of Amwas, which stands square in the middle of the pass, just where it debouches into the Vale of Ajalon. The artillery of the division, assisted by some of the guns of the 75th Division, opened a vigorous fire on the enemy on Amwas Hill, to which the Turks made but a feeble reply, while the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade endeavoured to pass through the hills to the north, round the enemy's right flank.

All day the regiments struggled on among the rocks, scrambling up and down the steep hills, and making very slow progress. By four o'clock in the afternoon they had advanced barely five miles, and the order was then given to return, and leave the task to the infantry the next day. The threat to their flank had, however, been enough for the Turks, who retired during the night, abandoning four guns, the teams of which had been killed by the fire of the R.H.A.

There had been no fighting to speak of, but the action was of great interest from the associations of the place. From its position in the mouth of the valley, Amwas is, and always has been, the key of the pass to Jerusalem. Who holds this hill holds the city. From the earliest ages, all the armies that[Pg 103] have sought to take Jerusalem have passed this way, save only that of Joshua. Philistine and Hittite, Babylonian and Assyrian, Egyptian and Roman and Greek, Frankish Knights of the Cross, all have passed this way, and all have watered the hill of Amwas with their blood.

The Australian Mounted Division handed over the further advance to the 75th Division next day, and withdrew to the mouth of the Nahr Sukereir, to get grazing for its horses. Two days later the division marched back to El Mejdel, in order to relieve the supply situation. Our broad-gauge railway had now nearly reached this place, and it was possible to draw supplies direct from railhead with the divisional train.

The 8th and 22nd Brigades of the Yeomanry Division plunged into the hills on the morning of the 18th, and soon found themselves in difficulties. In this mountain country, in which there were no wheeled vehicles, and all goods were carried on the backs of donkeys, what was known to the natives as a good road was usually little more than a goat track, winding in and out among the boulders. As far as Beit Sira there was some semblance of a road, though, even on this portion of it, the gunners were at work all day removing the biggest of the boulders from the path, before their guns could pass. Beyond Beit Sira the road was nothing but the merest footpath, leading straight down and up the numerous deep and narrow ravines that intersect the country in all directions. Sometimes it required half an hour's reconnaissance to move forward half a mile.

Under such conditions, the 8th Brigade accomplished a remarkable feat in penetrating nearly as far as Beit Ur el Tahta by nightfall. The 22nd Brigade reached Shilta the same evening, but had to[Pg 104] send back all its guns and transport, owing to the difficulties of the country. The 6th Brigade, starting on the following morning, reached Beit Ur el Tahta about two in the afternoon.

Cavalry, as such, were really unable to operate in this country. They were confined to the roads, or the tracks that did duty as roads, and, even on these, they could often move only in single file. Consequently they were exceedingly vulnerable, and their inability to make effective use of flank guards, or even to deploy quickly when attacked, increased the dangers to which they were exposed. Horses were little more than an encumbrance, reducing the number of men available for dismounted fighting, largely increasing the amount of transport required, and adding but little to the mobility of the troops.

In the present case, however, there were several reasons for attempting to push the Yeomanry through the hills. In the first place it was known that the enemy forces had been broken into two widely separated groups, and there was thus little danger of any attack from the north, for the next few days at any rate. Moreover there was a saving of time in employing the Yeomanry instead of the 52nd Division, as the latter was a day's march farther west when the plan of advance was decided upon. Finally, native reports of the hill country had led to the belief that it was of a much easier nature than proved to be the case.

The winter rains broke with a heavy downpour on the 19th, and this added to the difficulties of the cavalry, turning the valley bottoms into a sea of viscid, black mud, and the beds of the ravines into rushing torrents. The sudden drop in temperature which accompanied the rain was a severe trial to our troops, who were dressed in light, khaki-drill clothing, and had no blankets, greatcoats, or tents.

[Pg 105]

During the morning of the 19th of November the 8th and 22nd Brigades struggled through the rain and mud along the Wadi el Sunt, towards Beitunia and Ain Arik respectively, but about mid-day they encountered a force of Turks which had come down the main road from Nablus to Bire, and then marched westwards to oppose the Yeomanry advance. Unable to make headway against the difficulties of the country and the opposition of the enemy, who was in considerable force, the brigades held their position, and awaited the arrival of the 6th Brigade.

On the 20th the division made another effort to get on, the 6th Brigade moving to the assistance of the 8th. All wheels, including the guns, had to be sent back to Ramleh, as they were unable to move, and water for horses was scarce, despite the rain. Strong, organised resistance was now encountered at Beitunia, and prisoners captured from the enemy in the course of the fighting proved to be men from fresh, well-trained units from Aleppo, part of the Yilderim force. Little headway was made during the day. Rain came on again in the night, and no supplies were able to reach the division.

Next day the Yeomanry made a final attempt to storm the high ridge of Beitunia, which had held up their advance for two days. The 6th and 8th Brigades attacked the ridge itself from the west, while the 22nd Brigade, operating farther north towards Ram Allah, tried to turn the enemy's right flank. The attacking brigades got to within a few hundred yards of Beitunia village, on the top of the ridge, when they encountered a fresh enemy force, that outnumbered them by three to one. The Turks had a number of field and mountain guns, that had come from the north along the metalled road, while our troops had only one mountain[Pg 106] battery. The Yeomanry made several desperate attempts to force their way up the steep, rocky sides of the ridge, but were unable to reach the top. Early in the afternoon, more enemy reinforcements arrived from the north, and counter-attacked strongly, forcing our troops back into the deep ravine on the west side of the ridge. The situation soon became serious, and orders were given for all three brigades to break off the action and retire to Beit Ur el Foka. The withdrawal began after dark, and was carried out successfully.

It is almost impossible to exaggerate the difficulties of the cavalry. The country was a maze of high, rocky ridges, running in all directions, and separated by deep and narrow ravines, the sides of which were almost precipitous, and the bottoms muddy morasses. The ground was covered with a mass of boulders, among which grew sparse patches of coarse scrub. Mounted work was, of course, out of the question in such country, and all the horses had to be kept far back from the fighting line. A quarter of the whole force was thus occupied in holding the horses, and, as the division had already been considerably weakened by the fighting of the past three weeks, the actual number of rifles available for the advance was hopelessly inadequate. It was clear that the attempt of the division to reach the main road had been definitely checked, and the only thing to be done was to try and hold on to the positions already gained till reinforcements could arrive. Men and horses were short of food, owing to the great difficulty of getting up supplies in these roadless mountains during the rains.

While the Yeomanry Division was slowly fighting to a standstill in the north, the 75th Division, advancing along the main road towards Jerusalem,[Pg 107] and the 52nd Division on the track north of this road, through Beit Likia, pressed slowly forward, against strong resistance from the enemy, to Kustul and Beit Dukka respectively. The latter division sent a brigade to the north on the night of the 21st, and seized the high hill of Nebi Samwil, the traditional tomb of the Prophet Samuel. This hill dominates all the country to the east, even to Jerusalem itself, which can be seen from its summit. It was from here that the followers of Richard C?ur de Lion first looked upon Jerusalem in 1192, and pointed it out to the King. But Richard hid his face in his casque, lest he should see it, and prayed: 'Lord! let me not set mine eyes upon Thy Holy City till I have rescued it from the Infidel.'

Recognising the importance of this hill in operations against Jerusalem, the Turks next day launched a series of determined attacks against it, but were unable to retake it. Day after day, till within a few days of the surrender of the city, the enemy attacked the hill, and the fiercest and most sustained fighting of the campaign took place round it. But in spite of all their efforts, it remained in our hands, and became, at last, the key that opened to us the gates of the Holy City.

The next four days were comparatively quiet on the mountain front. Both sides were too exhausted by the arduous fighting they had undergone, and by the cold and wet, to make much effort, and operations were confined to minor enterprises.

During this period the Yeomanry Division held a line, running north and south, along the heights just east of Beit Ur el Foka, and extending for about three miles. On the 23rd all horses had to be sent back to Ramleh, as it was impossible any longer to transport forage to them in the mountains. The[Pg 108] following day the division made a demonstration along the whole front to assist the attack of the infantry against El Jib, where the Turks held a position barring our advance to the Nablus road. The enemy, however, was found in too great force for the attack to be pushed home, and, after being repulsed in three desperate assaults, our infantry had to abandon the attempt.

Meanwhile, on the plain, the Anzac Division had remained in observation of the enemy along the Auja, and had been engaged in active patrol work and reconnaissances for crossing places. Four possible places had been located; a road bridge at Khurbet Hadrah, a ford about two miles farther east, another at Jerisheh, and a third at the mouth of the river. All these crossings were held by parties of the enemy. The average width of the river was thirty-five yards, and the depth five to seven feet. The banks were in most places steep, and the bottom was very muddy.

On the 24th the Division received orders to establish one or more bridgeheads north of the river, with the object of inducing the enemy to believe that we intended to make a farther advance along the coast. At least one of these bridgeheads was to be retained if possible.

General Chaytor decided to force the passage of the river by the ford at the mouth, where the bottom was sandy, covering the crossing by demonstrations at Hadrah and at the other two fords. The only troops available for the enterprise were the New Zealand Brigade and two battalions of infantry lent by the 54th Division,[14] a small enough force, in view of the known strength of the enemy. The rest of[Pg 109] the Anzac Division was, however, required to watch the enemy forces on the right, about Mulebbis, and in the foothills farther east.

The operations commenced shortly after mid-day, the infantry advancing with much noise and display on the bridge and upper fords, while the New Zealanders made for the ford at the mouth of the river. They crossed here without much difficulty, overpowering the small enemy post covering the ford, and then galloped along the north bank to Sheikh Muannis. An armoured car battery was now pushed up to the south bank of the Auja opposite Hadrah, and opened fire on the Turks holding the bridge there. At the same time the New Zealanders swept down on the flank from Muannis, and drove off the enemy. A battalion of infantry now crossed the river, and established a bridgehead on the north bank, with half the battalion at the bridge and half in the village of Muannis. During the night two squadrons of the New Zealand Brigade were posted on the high ground north of Hadrah and Sheikh Muannis, and a third covered the ford at the mouth of the river. Under cover of the darkness the divisional engineers threw a pontoon bridge across the river at Jerisheh, which was held by the other battalion of infantry.

arrival

Arrival of Marshal von Falkenhayn in Jerusalem in 1917.
(From an enemy photograph.)

howitzer

9.45 inch Austrian Howitzer on the Nablus road.
(From an enemy photograph.)

Just after dawn next morning, the cavalry north of the river were heavily attacked by a large force of Turks, and driven back. The enemy followed up resolutely, and attacked the bridgehead at Hadrah. The squadron at the mouth of the river, reinforced by another regiment, was ordered to move against the Turkish right, while the remaining regiment of the brigade moved up to the south bank of the Auja at Hadrah. The Somerset Battery R.H.A., the only available artillery, came into action close[Pg 110] by, the fire of the guns being directed by the battery commander from a house in Sheikh Muannis, across the river.

At half-past eight, the bridgehead at Hadrah was driven in, and the infantry fell back across the river. At the same time the two companies in Sheikh Muannis, which were moving to the support of the bridgehead, were heavily counter-attacked, and driven back to Jerisheh, where they crossed by the pontoon bridge, covered by the two squadrons of New Zealanders. The led horses of these squadrons were sent back to the ford at the mouth of the river at a gallop. They had to run the gauntlet of close-range rifle and machine-gun fire, but got through with comparatively few casualties, and crossed the river under cover of the squadron there, which then withdrew to the south bank.

The last man to leave Sheikh Muannis was the battery commander. He remained, coolly directing the fire of his guns, till the Turks were in the village, and then made a run for it, swimming the river under fire, and got safely away. His fine work had greatly assisted the retirement of our small force.

As soon as the last of our troops had been safely withdrawn, the Anzac Division fell back to a position on the high ground overlooking the south bank of the Auja, from Yahudieh, through Nebi Tari, to the sea, and hurriedly dug in, expecting an attack. The Turks, however, seemed to be content with having thrown our troops back across the river, and made no further move.

The operations had shown that the enemy was in such force that it would be impossible to maintain a bridgehead on the right bank, without holding the whole of the high ground two miles north of the river.[Pg 111] As sufficient troops were not available for this purpose, the line south of the Auja, which commanded all the crossing places, was entrenched and held by the Anzac Division, supported by a brigade of infantry, until the second, and successful, passage of the river four weeks later.
FOOTNOTES:

[14] This division had arrived from Gaza on the 19th, and was holding a line from the right of the Anzac Division to the village of Shilta, about five miles west of the left of the Yeomanry Division.