CHAPTER XI. THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL.

It has long been a well-authenticated fact that MacMahon’s march eastward from Reims took the German head-quarter staff by surprise. The reason was that they could not believe in the probability of a movement which, from their point of view, had no defence on military grounds. So that Marshal MacMahon with a fair, and General von Moltke with full knowledge of the facts, really arrived at identical conclusions when they surveyed the situation with what we may call cold scientific eyes. The influences which governed the Marshal’s decision could not be known at Bar le Duc on the 25th of August; but it was none the less apparent to the cautious Von Moltke that his adversary had committed a great error. The German was surprised, he was even somewhat embarrassed, but he never lost his presence of mind, and he was not unprepared.

Indeed, the subject had been discussed already by himself and his colleagues. As early as the 23rd, Prince Frederick Charles intercepted a letter from an officer of high rank belonging to the Metz Army. The writer expressed a confident hope that succour would soon arrive from Chalons. Thereupon the Saxon Prince was directed to keep a sharp look-out towards Reims, and break the [p 245] railway between Thionville and Longuyon in more places than one. The next day, at Ligny, the Great Staff met and conferred with the Crown Prince. It was then that Quartermaster-General von Podbielski was the first to suggest that if a march from Reims towards Bazaine was barely admissible on military grounds, it might be explained by political considerations, and consequently, the General thought, the German Armies should close to their right. The reason was not deemed sufficient, and the Armies went on as pre-arranged. Not until eleven in the evening of the 24th did the wary Von Moltke consider that he had accumulated information sufficient to justify a tentative change of plans. He learned from his own cavalry patrols that Chalons had been deserted; from a Paris newspaper, captured on the 24th, that MacMahon was at Reims with 150,000 men; and finally he got a telegram, dated Paris, the 23rd, and received at Bar le Duc via London. “The Army of MacMahon,” it said, “is concentrated at Reims. With it are the Emperor Napoleon and the Prince. MacMahon seeks to effect a junction with Bazaine.” Still Von Moltke doubted. The straight line to Metz was barred, would the enemy venture to face the risks involved in a circuitous march close to the Belgian frontier? If he did the German Armies must plunge into the Argonne; but at present the General decided that enough would be done were the Army turned to the north-west, and were a keen watch kept upon its own right by sending the cavalry, if possible, as far as Vouziers and Buzancy. Such were the morning orders. Here it may be noted that Von Moltke spent the afternoon in framing a plan, solely for himself, based on the shrewd assumption that MacMahon might have quitted Reims on the 23rd, and might be over the Aisne already. If he moved on continuously he could not be caught on the left bank of [p 246] the Meuse. Therefore Von Moltke drew out tables of marches which, had they all been performed, as they easily might have been, would have concentrated, in full time, 150,000 men at Damvillers, east of the Meuse, and within easy reach of the Army blockading Metz. Two corps, from that force, were also called on to co-operate. They did move out as far as Etain and Briey, but not being wanted they soon returned to their cantonments on the Orne and the Yron. Thus the plan was not carried out, but it was prepared, indeed, served as a basis, during the next two days, and was ready for execution; and it reveals, once more, the astonishing foresight and solid ingenuity which watched with sleepless eyes over the conduct of the German Armies.

After he had finished the scheme by means of which he intended to thwart MacMahon, in any case, fresh intelligence arrived—newspaper articles and speeches in the Chamber which declared that the French people would be covered with shame were the Army of the Rhine not relieved; and above all a telegram from London, based on a paragraph in “Le Temps,” of August 23rd, stating that MacMahon, although by such a movement he would uncover the road to Paris, had suddenly determined to help Bazaine, and that he had already quitted Reims, but that the news from Montmédy did not mention the arrival of French troops, meaning troops from Metz, in that region. Von Moltke was not deeply impressed by the articles and speeches, although he begun to give some weight to Podbielski’s shrewd remark; but the positive statement in the telegram did move him, and he and the Quartermaster-General hastened to lay the matter before the King. The result was that those definite orders were issued which produced the great right wheel and sent the whole force towards the north. Nevertheless, the strategist still insists [p 247] that, on the evening of the 25th, he had no information which gave sure indications of the enemy’s whereabouts.
The Cavalry Discover the Enemy.

These were soon forthcoming. The cavalry, set in motion at dawn, over a wide space and far in advance of the new direction, were not long in regaining touch of MacMahon’s Army. For the horsemen rode out quickly, and speedily searched the country side from Dun on the Meuse to the heart of the camp at Chalons, accumulating in their excursions information almost sufficient to convince the circumspect Von Moltke. This sudden display of activity and daring is a splendid spectacle. The wind howled through the woods and swept the bare tracks, and heavy storms of rain deluged the country from Bar le Duc to Rhetel, but the swift march of these superb reiters was neither stayed by the blast, the dripping woods, nor the saturated cross-roads. No hardships, no obstacles slackened their speed, and large were the fruits of their energy, endurance, and astuteness. Here we may observe, and it is a remarkable fact, that hitherto the Saxon leader’s cavalry had been directed only towards the west. The horsemen of the Third Army had ridden within sight of Reims and on the south, or left flank, had approached closely to the Aube. Those attached to the Saxon Prince’s command had felt out to their immediate front and towards the Prussian Crown Prince’s left, but had not examined the districts to their right front. A cavalry regiment had made a tiring forced march towards Stenay, but not a trooper was directed on Grand Pré, or on Varennes, until the 25th. Yet there were French horse on Grand Pré on the 24th, and it is evident that had only one division been despatched towards and through Varennes immediately [p 248] after the Saxon Prince’s troops had crossed the Meuse, above and below Verdun, the presence of MacMahon’s Army on the Aisne must have been discovered, and the report handed in at head-quarters on the morning, or at latest the afternoon, of the 25th. That would have been done had General von Schlotheim, the chief of the staff with the Meuse Army, been as careful to reconnoitre the country on his right as Von Blumenthal was to send out horsemen to the flank as well as the front of the westward moving host. It was not done, and the error of judgment involved the loss of four-and-twenty hours.

The error was promptly and amply repaired. While each corps in the mighty Army, having wheeled to the right, was tramping north in the driving rain through the muddy forest roads to gain the distant bivouacs assigned them, the cavalry divisions had come up with, watched, touched, astonished, and bewildered the French, making the 26th of August a memorable day in their camps.

Near the Meuse the ubiquitous patrols discovered troops at Buzancy; upon the central road which runs beside the Aire, the foremost squadron saw infantry and cavalry in Grand Pré; upon the Aisne, two adventurous parties pressing up close to the flank and rear of Vouziers, were able to observe and report the presence of large bodies of all arms encamped to the east of the town, and to specify the positions which they held. No attempt was made to attack, and there was no firing except a sputter of carbine-shots discharged by a French at a German patrol which had approached the left bank of the Aire near Grand Pré. The whole line of horsemen, from the Meuse to the Aisne, was in constant communication, and their scouting parties, eager to see and not be seen, found their designs favoured by the abounding woods and the undulations of the land. Thus, in one day, a thick fringe of lynx-eyed cavalry was [p 249] thrust in close proximity to the adversary many miles in front of the German Corps, plodding their arduous way along the plashy tracks and by-ways of the Argonne.
Movements of the French.

No such bold and prudent use was made of the French cavalry by Marshal MacMahon, whom we left with his Army still lingering near the Aisne. The misgivings which oppressed him at Reims did not diminish during his halt at Rhetel; and they deepened as he moved towards the Meuse. But no doubts, based on the absence of intelligence from or concerning Bazaine and the difficulty of supplying the Army, will account for the misuse which he made of his cavalry. The danger he had to dread lurked in the region to the south, yet after the 24th the duty of covering the exposed right flank and of gleaning exact information was imposed upon the brigade attached to the 7th Corps. For Margueritte’s division of Chasseurs d’Afrique was, on the 25th, suddenly drawn from the right and sent forward to Le Chesne in front of the centre pointing towards Sedan or Stenay; while Bonnemain’s division of heavy cavalry moved slowly close in rear of the 1st Corps, where it was useless. The incidents of the memorable 26th, when even minutes were priceless, quickly demonstrated the gravity of the error. On that day, at the close of a brief march, the 12th Corps stood at Tourteron, the 5th at Le Chesne, the 1st at Semuy, and the 7th a little east of Vouziers. Margueritte moved on to Oches, and Bonnemain’s was at Attigny, on the left bank of the Aisne.

Now Douay, who commanded the 7th Corps, had become anxious, for he was on the outward flank. He sought some security by sending a brigade, under General Bordas, to Buzancy and Grand Pré, and his strongest regiment of [p 250] Hussars to scout along the two rivers which unite at Senuc. The Hussar patrols came in contact with the German, and it was one of them which emptied its carbines at the hostile and inquisitive dragoons of the 5th Cavalry Division. Retiring hastily on Grand Pré the French Hussars handed in reports which so impressed General Bordas that he at once contemplated a retreat on Buzancy, and forwarded the alarming message to his Corps Commander. General Douay instantly inferred that the dreaded German Army was not distant, and, ordering Bordas to retreat on Vouziers, he sent the baggage and provisions to the rear, and drew up his divisions in line of battle, at the junction of the roads from Grand Pré and Buzancy. Just before sunset a horseman rode up with a message that, after all, Bordas had not retired from the village which he occupied, though he believed the road to Vouziers was intercepted, and that the enemy might be upon him at any moment. The remedy applied was to send forth General Dumont with a brigade to bring him in. While Dumont marched in the darkness Douay and his staff passed the night at a bivouac fire listening eagerly to every sound, and starting up when the step of a wayfarer or the clink of a horseshoe fell on their ears. About three in the morning of the 27th Dumont brought in Bordas and his brigade, together with a few Germans who, pressing too far forward at eventide, had been captured. Nor did the effect produced by the enterprising German cavalry end here. General Douay had sent in to MacMahon a report of the exciting incidents; and with the morning light came the information that the Marshal had directed the whole Army to draw near and support the 7th Corps. So it fell out that the mere appearance of the German cavalry had arrested the French. But at the same time their leaders were also told by fugitive country folk—nothing definite could be extracted from the [p 251] prisoners taken at Grand Pré—that the Prussian Crown Prince was at Sainte-Menehould, and that another army—whence derived, in what strength, or by whom commanded they could not imagine—was advancing from Varennes.
The Marshal Resolves, Hesitates, and Yields.

We now touch on the moment when the decision was adopted which impelled the French Army on its final marches towards defeat and captivity; a decision mainly due to the extreme pressure exerted by the Comte de Palikao and the Regency. Marshal MacMahon had transferred his head-quarters to Le Chesne-Populeux, a village on the canal which connects the Aisne and the Meuse. The 12th Corps was there, with the 5th in its front at Brieulles sur Bar; the 7th, as before, at Vouziers, and the 1st in its rear at Yoncq; Margueritte’s horse at Beaumont, and Bonnemain’s still about Attigny. The information placed before the Marshal by the inhabitants and his own officers seemed to justify those apprehensions which he had so strongly expressed at Reims, and he began to feel again that he was marching towards that “disaster which he wished to avoid.” In the midst of a prolonged survey of the position, he was summoned by the Emperor who, having received some authentic information, declared that the Prussian Crown Prince had turned from the road to Paris and was then advancing northwards. With Napoleon III. MacMahon remained for a long time, and came back to his head-quarters resolved to retreat upon Mézières. Indeed, he issued orders on the spot, directing all the Corps to retire behind the canal the next day, and take post at Chagny, Vendresse, and Poix. Then, at half-past eight in the evening of the 27th, he dictated to Colonel Stoffel a telegram designed for the Minister, in which he said that there was [p 252] one hostile Army on the right bank of the Meuse and another marching upon the Ardennes. “I have no news of Bazaine,” he went on. “If I advance to meet him I shall be attacked in front by a part of the First and Second German Armies, which, favoured by the woods, can conceal a force superior to mine, and at the same time attacked by the Prussian Crown Prince cutting off my line of retreat. I approach Mézières to-morrow, whence I shall continue my retreat, guided by events, towards the west.” Colonel Stoffel relates that, just as he was about to carry the telegram to Colonel d’Abzac, with orders to forward it at once, General Faure, chief of the staff, came in; and MacMahon, seizing the telegram, said, “Here is a despatch which I have written to the Minister.” Faure read, and begged the Marshal not to send it, for, said he, “You will get an answer from Paris, which, perhaps, will prevent you from carrying out your new plans. You can transmit it to-morrow, when we are already on the road to Mézières.” The Marshal answered, “Send it,” and it was sent.

The reply, so shrewdly foreseen by General Faure, was handed to the Marshal about half-past one on the morning of the 28th. It was dated, “Paris, August 27, 11 p.m.,” addressed to “the Emperor,” and began with these tell-tale words, “If you abandon Bazaine,” wrote the Comte de Palikao, “‘la revolution est dans Paris,’ or Paris will revolt, and you will be attacked yourself by all the enemy’s forces.” He asserted that Paris could defend herself, that the Army must reach Bazaine; that the Prussian Crown Prince, aware of the danger to which his Army and that which blockaded Metz, was exposed by MacMahon’s turning movement, had changed front to the north. “You are at least six-and-thirty, perhaps eight-and-forty, hours in advance of him,” the Minister continued. “You have before you only a part of the forces blockading Metz, which, seeing [p 253] you retire from Chalons to Reims, stretched out towards the Argonne. Your movement on Reims deceived them. Everybody here feels the necessity of extricating Bazaine, and the anxiety with which your course is followed is extreme.” The Marshal’s will broke down under this strain. He could not bear the thought that men might in future point to him as one who deserted a brother Marshal. Against his better judgment he revoked the orders already issued, enjoining a retreat upon Mézières, and put all his Corps in motion for the banks of the Meuse. To complete the narrative of this decisive event, it may here be said that, on the 28th, at Stonne, as the Marshal himself has admitted, the Emperor made a last desperate appeal against the change of plan. Another despatch from Palikao, dated half-past one in the morning of the 28th, this time addressed to the Marshal, had come to hand at Stonne. “In the name of the Council of Ministers and the Privy Council,” it said, “I request you [‘je vous demande’] to succour Bazaine—profiting by the thirty hours’ advance which you have over the Crown Prince of Prussia. I direct Vinoy’s Corps on Reims.”

It is probable that the purport, or a copy of this telegram, was sent to the Emperor, for he twice, through his own officers, reminded the Marshal that the despatches of a Minister were not orders, and that he was free to act as he thought expedient, and implored him to reflect maturely before he gave up his intention to retreat. So much must be said for Napoleon III.—that, at Metz, on the morrow of Woerth and Spicheren, and at Stonne, when the toils were fast closing round him, his military judgment was prompt and correct. But the Marshal had decided; and the prayers of an Emperor did not avail against the gloomy forecasts, the impassioned language, and the formal request or demand of a Minister of War whose telegrams exhibit the depth of [p 254] his ignorance concerning the actual situation. It is not surprising that he was ill-informed, seeing how difficult it was for officers on the spot, German as well as French, to obtain exact knowledge; but it is amazing that an experienced soldier and Minister of War should not be aware of his own incompetence to direct, from his closet in Paris, an army in the field. Palikao combined the qualities of the Dutch Deputy with those of the Aulic Councillor; and the troops of Marshal MacMahon tramped on to meet their approaching ruin. The positions they attained on the 28th will be more conveniently specified later on; for it is time to follow, once more, the footsteps of the hardy and far-marching Germans, who were now across the direct path of MacMahon’s Army.
Movements of the Germans.

How, by long and laborious marches, the tough foot soldiers, almost treading on the heels of their mounted comrades, gained ground on the adversary must now be succinctly narrated. On the 26th, the 12th Corps reached Varennes, and the Saxon Prince established his head-quarters at Clermont in Argonne. The Guard went on to Dombasle, and the 4th Corps to a point beyond Fleury. Such were the marches of the Army of the Meuse. In the Third Army, the Bavarians made a wet and weary night march in the wake of the 4th Corps, attaining Triaucourt and Erize la Petite; but for the moment, the 5th, the 6th, and the Würtembergers stood fast. The reason for this apparent hesitation was that Von Moltke was not yet quite convinced. King William remained at Bar le Duc all the forenoon. Thither came the Crown Prince and General von Blumenthal from Ligny, and, at a council held in the great head-quarters, both of them declared [p 255] unequivocally in favour of the northern march, urging that it would be wiser to delay the movement on Paris than run the risks of a battle in the north unless it could be fought by all the forces which could be got together. These opinions prevailed, and it was decided that the Bavarians should start at once, and that the next day the other Corps of the Third Army should proceed to Sainte-Menehould and Vavray. General von Blumenthal, indeed, had formed a strong judgment on the situation. A few hours after the consultation at head-quarters, writes Dr. William Russell in his “Diary,” “taking me into a room in which was a table covered with a large map on a scale of an inch to a mile, he (Blumenthal) said, ‘These French are lost, you see. We know they are there, and there, and there—and Mahon’s whole Army. Where can they go to? Poor foolish fellows! They must go to Belgium, or fight there and be lost;’ and he put his finger on the map between Mézières and Carignan.” It is a remarkable fact that General Longstreet judging only from the telegrams which reached the United States about this time, arrived at the same conclusion.

King William, during the afternoon, journeyed to Clermont; while the Crown Prince drove to Revigny les Vaches, which he made his head-quarters until the 28th. Before losing sight of Bar le Duc, we may quote from Dr. Russell’s pages one other sentence, which affords a brief glimpse of the great political leader in this war. In the forenoon on the 26th, the graphic Diarist “saw Count Bismarck standing in a doorway out of the rain whiffing a prodigious cigar, seemingly intent on watching the bubbles which passed along the watercourse by the side of the street;” but probably with his thoughts far away from the evanescent symbols of men’s lives. He had entered the town with the King on the 24th, and feared that the royal staff [p 256] would linger there for several days, “as in Capua;” yet, in a few hours, this playful censor of delay was speeding North, like the Armies, to play a conspicuous part in a sublime tragedy at Sedan.

In his quarters at Clermont, General von Moltke still disposed of the Meuse Army and the Bavarians in a manner which would enable him to effect, if necessary, that concentration at Damvillers which we saw him meditating and devising on the afternoon of the 25th, at Bar le Duc. Thus, on the 27th, the Guard, which came up to Monfaucon, and the 4th Corps to Germonville, were each directed to throw bridges over the Meuse, so that there should be four points of passage in case of need. The Bavarians followed from the rear as far as Dombasle and Nixéville, and the other Corps of the Third Army turned frankly northward, the 5th pushing its advance-guard to Sainte-Menehould. At the same time the Saxon Corps had crossed the Meuse at Dun and established a brigade firmly in Stenay. The cavalry had been as active and as useful as ever. They had covered the march of the Saxon Corps by occupying Grand Pré, Nouart, and Buzancy, coming into contact with the French at the last-named village. General de Failly, who, early in the morning, had moved to Bar, observed hostile cavaliers beyond the stream, and sent Brahaut’s brigade to drive them off and seize prisoners. That brought on a smart skirmish, during which De Failly received orders to retreat on Brieulles; but Brahaut was driven from Buzancy by the fire of a horse battery; and the unlucky French General made no prisoners. There was no other rencontre during the day, but the German cavalry on all sides rode up close to the enemy’s posts and kept the leaders well informed. From the reports sent in, Von Moltke inferred that there had been a pause in the French movements; at all events, that none of their troops [p 257] had crossed the Meuse; and, as he knew that the Saxons were in Dun and Stenay, he thought himself, at length, justified in believing it possible that he might strike MacMahon on the left bank. Consequently, he abandoned the Damvillers plan, and sent back to Metz the two Corps which had been detached from the blockading army. Therefore, while the Saxons stood fast, for one day, the Bavarians were directed to march, on the 28th, upon Varennes and Vienne le Chateau; the Guard upon Banthéville; and the 4th Corps on Montfaucon—the general direction for all the Corps being Vouziers, Buzancy, and Beaumont. During that day these orders were fulfilled, each Corps duly attaining its specified destination; the Guard and 4th Corps, before they started, taking up the bridges thrown over the Meuse. Four divisions of cavalry were out prying, through the mist, into every movement of the 5th and 7th French Corps, whose left flank, it was ascertained, was absolutely unguarded, so that the German horse looked on, and, in some cases, were misled by the astonishing confusion displayed by the enemy’s vacillating motions.
Effects of MacMahon’s Counter-Orders.

The fatal decision adopted at Le Chesne on the night of the 27th brought disorder and disaster upon the French Army. The wise resolve to retreat on Mézières, strangely as the statement may sound, had rekindled the fading spirits of the French soldiers. As soon as the fact was communicated to them they sprung with alacrity to perform the task of preparation. The officer who bore the order to the 7th Corps started from Le Chesne at six o’clock, and by nine at night the baggage, the provision transport, the engineers’ park, were actually in motion for Chagny, [p 258] through the long defile which leads to Le Chesne. The cavalry were despatched to watch the flanks, and the infantry in silence and darkness glided towards their first halting place, Quatre Champs. “Everyman,” says Prince Bibesco, who was an eye-witness, “marched with a firm step. All seemed to have forgotten the cold, the rain, and the anxiety of the preceding days.” They drank in hope with the refreshing air, and then their hopes were suddenly extinguished; for as they were near Quatre Champs, at half-past five in the morning, an aide-de-camp from MacMahon rode up to General Douay and told him the latest decision—the Army was to move upon the Meuse.

The orders brought by the ill-omened messenger were that the 7th Corps, that very day, should move to Nouart, which it was not destined to reach; the 5th Beauclair, which it could not attain; that the 12th should gain La Besace, and the 1st Le Chesne, both of which marches were duly performed. Bonnemains’ heavy brigade of horse was sent to Les Grands Armoises, and Margueritte’s towards Mouzon, but afterwards to Sommauthe. The 7th Corps, fearing greatly for its baggage train, already far away, set out again and only reached Boult-aux-Bois, the men on short rations, the horses without a feed of oats. The same troubles beset the other corps which had despatched their trains northward. But the largest share of ill-fortune befell De Failly. He was ordered to march by way of Buzancy upon Nouart and Beauclair—indeed, to get as far forward as he could on the road to Stenay. The Marshal knew it was occupied, for he told De Failly to expect a sharp resistance before he could carry it. But when within sight of Harricourt and Bar his adventures began. He discerned hostile cavalry in his path; they were vigilant Uhlans of the Guard. De Failly halted; the cavalry increased, became enterprising, and some shots [p 259] were exchanged; but in the end the French General, finding that he could not rely upon the support of Douay, who was resting his wearied men at Boult-aux-Bois, and believing that the direct road to Nouart was commanded by the enemy, he turned aside and, through narrow muddy lanes, made his way by Sommauthe to Belval and Bois les Dames, the last division not arriving at the camp until eight in the evening. Nevertheless, his appearance at and south of Bois les Dames so imposed on the German cavalry scouts that they retired from Nouart in the afternoon. The movements and halts of both French corps had been observed, and when night fell the Germans at Bayonville saw the French bivouac fires beyond Buzancy and in the direction of Stenay. At this time there were no hostile German infantry west of the Meuse nearer than Banthéville; for the troops on the flank of the French, from Vouziers to Dun, were wholly horsemen. No more valuable demonstration of the priceless value of cavalry was ever made than that afforded by the Teutons during this campaign. They were more than the “eyes and ears of the Army;” they were an impenetrable screen concealing from view the force and the movements of the adversary, who was still engaged in pushing up his troops in the hope of compelling the French to fight a decisive battle on the 30th. That hope, entertained by Von Moltke on the 28th, was not fulfilled, because, at the last moment, MacMahon turned his Army from Stenay upon Mouzon. On that day the King moved on to Varennes, and the Prince, his son, to Sainte-Menehould.
German and French Operations on the 29th.

The position of affairs on the evening of the 28th was somewhat perplexing, because the earlier reports sent in to [p 260] head-quarters indicated, what was the fact for a brief interval, that the French were retiring northward. But no sooner had orders been issued to fit that state of things than certain information came to hand which showed that the Meuse was again their immediate objective; and it was then that, by abstaining from provocation, Von Moltke judged it possible to move up troops sufficient to fight with advantage on the 30th, somewhere west of Stenay. The Saxon Prince, acting within the discretionary limits allowed him, decided to cross the Meuse with the 12th Corps, and bring up the Guard and 4th to Buzancy and Nouart, but to evade a battle, and content himself with the fulfilling the task of obtaining intelligence. The orders were issued, and, while they were in execution, one body of cavalry tracked the 7th Corps during its painful march to Oches and St. Pierremont, and saw the divisions settling down in their bivouacs; and another made prize of Le Capitaine Marquis de Grouchy bearing despatches from MacMahon to De Failly. This was an important capture, for it not only deprived the unfortunate General of vital orders, but it placed in the hands of Von Moltke the arrangements which the Marshal had drawn up to guide the motions of his Corps. Out of this mishap grew a fresh misfortune for the French.

Marshal MacMahon, on the morning of the 28th, framed his plans on the supposition that he would be able to pass the Meuse at Stenay, and kept the heads of his columns pointing south-west; but learning at a later period that the Saxons were posted at that place in force—his reports said 15,000 men—he was again, at midnight, obliged to change his scheme, and he resolved to pass the river at Mouzon and Remilly. He, therefore, sent out orders directing the 12th Corps and Margueritte’s cavalry to Mouzon, for, having no pontoon train, he was compelled to [p 261] seek permanent bridges; the 1st Corps and Bonnemains’ horse to Raucourt; the 7th to La Besace, which, as we have seen, they did not reach, but halted at Oches and St. Pierremont; and the 5th to Beaumont, which place they entered after weary marches and a sharp action. These were the orders for the day which, with other useful documents, were found in the pockets of De Grouchy. No special interest pertains to the march of the 1st Corps. The 12th found its way safely to Mouzon, crossed the river, and occupied the heights on the right bank, while General Margueritte despatched some of his Chasseurs on the Stenay road. What then happened? The Chasseurs returned and reported that they had seen no enemy, although at that moment Stenay was held by the enemy’s horse and foot. “They committed,” writes General Lebrun, then commanding the 12th Corps, “the fault which in former wars was made a ground of reproach against the French cavalry.” When in sight of Stenay they saw no Germans and turned back instead of pushing on to and beyond the town, or trying to do so; and the corps commander justly regards this laxity as a grave fault. So Lebrun, resting at Mouzon, could learn nothing, either from spies or his famous Chasseurs, respecting an enemy then within a few miles. The irony of the situation was complete when, a little later, the Zieten Hussars from Stenay rode up to Margueritte’s vedettes, and found him although he could not find them. In that fashion the French made war in 1870. General de Failly and his 5th Corps were more severely treated, for their ill-luck and misdirection brought upon them
The Combat at Nouart.

Acting on verbal instructions, given on the night of the 28th, at Belval, by a staff officer from the head-quarters at [p 262] Stonne, De Failly set out the next morning towards Beaufort and Beauclair, two villages a few miles south-west of Stenay. He did not know, as we do, that the Marshal had changed his plans, and that the officer bearing the countermanding order had fallen into the hands of a German patrol. The French General did not break up his camp and quit Belval until ten o’clock in the morning, which gave the Saxons, who had been brought over the Meuse from Dun, plenty of time to watch his movements. Indeed, he could see them, troops of all arms, on the heights of Nouart, moving, as he judged, in an easterly direction, which was an error, possibly arising from some turn in the road, for the whole 12th Corps were over the Meuse between Dun and Nouart. General de Failly disposed his troops in two columns, one of which marched towards Beaufort by country roads; the other, with the General, consisting of Guyot de Lespart’s division and two regiments of Brahaut’s cavalry, made for Beauclair. Their road lay through the valley of the Wiseppe, a sluggish stream meandering through a marshy bottom land and passing Beaufort on its way to the Meuse. The route through Nouart was barred by the Germans, and when the leading French squadrons, crossing the valley to gain the main road, began to ascend the slopes, they suddenly came under a smart fire from infantry and guns. The French Hussars flitted fast back across the meadows, and De Failly at once stopped the march of both columns, putting his infantry and guns in position, and resting them principally upon two small villages. Then ensued, about noon, an indecisive but vexatious combat, for the Germans did not intend to attack in force, but simply harass and delay the 5th Corps; and De Failly, uncertain respecting the numbers which might be hidden by the woods, dared not retort, especially as he was remote from the French [p 263] Army and without support from any other corps. So, for several hours, the fight went on. The object of the Saxons, who descended into the valley, was simply to detain the French, and, although the assailants traversed the brook and the high road, pushing forward a few companies and supporting them by an artillery fire from the heights, they did not come to close quarters. General de Failly was of opinion that he had repelled an attack, and that the enemy did not renew it because the French were so strongly posted; but the truth is that Prince George of Saxony not only held back his superior force because he had been enjoined to abstain from a serious engagement, but was himself misled by erroneous reports respecting the state of affairs towards Stenay. Soon after four o’clock De Failly also drew off; he had then just received a duplicate of the order directing him upon Beaumont. He sadly deplores the mischance, and pathetically relates how all his wearied troops reached Beaumont “during the night,” except the rear-guard, which did not enter the camp until five o’clock on the morning of the 30th.
The State of Affairs at Sundown.

Thus, for the French, terminated another day of error and loss, which left three Corps still on the left bank of the Meuse. When the sun went down, the German horse were close to every one of them except the 12th, which, it will be remembered, was on the right bank near Mouzon. The active cavalry moved in the rear of the 1st Corps, seizing prisoners at Voncq, riding up to Le Chesne, and keeping watch through the night upon the wearied 7th Corps, as it sought repose in the camps of Oches and St. Pierremont. The German Infantry Corps, meantime, had been closing up for the final onslaught. The 12th Corps [p 264] was in and about Nouart, covered by outposts and patrols, which stretched away to Stenay. The Guard was at Buzancy, the 4th Corps at Remonville; the 5th Corps was at Grand Pré, with the Würtembergers near at hand; the Bavarians had come up to Sommerance and its neighbourhood on both banks of the Aisne; the 11th Corps stood at Monthois on the left, while the 6th Corps was in the rear at Vienne le Chateau. The head-quarters of King William were set up in Grand Pré, under the old gloomy castle, the Prussian Prince was near by at the little village of Senuc, and the Saxon Prince at Bayonville. Thus, in three days, the whole Army had drawn together, facing north, and was ready, at a signal, to spring forward and grapple with the enemy who had committed himself so rashly to a flank march in the face of the most redoubtable generals, and the best instructed, disciplined and rapidly-marching troops in Europe.

Examining attentively the reports which reached him from all points of the extensive curve upon which the cavalry were so active, and poring over the map, General von Moltke at length formed a definite judgment on the position as it appeared to him through this medium. He inferred that the Army of Chalons was marching in a north-west direction towards the Meuse; that its principal forces were then probably between Le Chesne and Beaumont, with strong rear guards to the south; and the practical result of his cogitations was that the German Armies should move upon the line Le Chesne-Beaumont in such a way as might enable them to attack the enemy before he reached the Meuse. Therefore, the Saxon Prince’s Army, except the Guard, which was to become the reserve, was to march early on Beaumont, two Corps of the Third Army were to support the Saxon onset, but the left of that Army was to march on Le Chesne. As a matter of fact, [p 265] the French, in part at least, were nearer the Meuse than Von Moltke supposed, for the 12th Corps was on the right bank, and the 1st at Raucourt; while the 7th was at Oches, the 5th at Beaumont, and there were no troops at Le Chesne except stragglers. MacMahon took in the situation; he was resolved to pass the river “co?te que co?te”: and his chance of doing so, even then, depended on the rapidity with which his troops could march. The 5th Corps was struck and routed the next day, but the French Army did succeed in effecting a passage over the stream.
The Battle of Beaumont.

The German Armies had now fairly entered the Ardennes, formerly the northern district of the old province of Champagne. It is a land of vast woods which crowd one upon another between the Bar and the Meuse. Looking from some smooth hill-top, the landscape, in summer, wears the aspect of a boundless forest, the dark furrowed lines of shadow alone indicating the hollows, gullies, ravines, and defiles. Here and there may be seen a church or chateau, or a glimpse may be caught of a road bordered by tall trees. The woods are so dense that infantry, still less guns and horsemen, cannot work through them, or move at all, except upon the high roads, lanes and tracks, worn by the villagers and farm people. Marshy brooks lurk under the green covert, and rivulets burrow their way through steep banks. Yet there are open spaces in the maze of verdure, farmsteads and fields, and rounded heights whence the tourist may contemplate the extensive panorama. It is not a country which lends itself easily to military operations, but one more suitable to the sportsman than the soldier. The boar of the Ardennes is still famous and it is on record that a certain Herr von [p 266] Bismarck, once upon a time, hunted the wolf through the snow in the very region where he was hunting the French in August, 1870.

It was amidst these thickets, dingles, and almost pathless wilds that the French had to retreat and the Germans to pursue. We have seen that General de Failly’s Corps was struggling all night to reach what they hoped would be a comparative haven of rest at Beaumont, a bourgade upon the high road from Le Chesne to Stenay, planted down in a hollow, surrounded by gardens, and having in its centre a fine church visible from afar. Here he pitched his tents, so that his tired soldiers might recover from the fatigues they had endured in useless marches; and he thought, in his simple way, that he might safely defer his march until the afternoon. Yet Marshal MacMahon had visited the camp early in the morning, and if he used language to De Failly, as he probably did, similar to that which he employed at Oches, it should have quickened the General’s movements and saved him from defeat. For, after visiting Beaumont, MacMahon, much concerned for the 7th as well as the 5th Corps, rode into the camp at Oches. The trains had entered the defile leading to Stonne, some hours earlier, preceded and escorted by the brigades of Conseil Dumesnil’s Division, and the 2nd Division was just about to start, leaving the 3rd as a rear-guard. “You will have 60,000 men upon your hands, this evening,” he said, “if you do not succeed in getting beyond the Meuse.” Urging Douay to get rid of his heavy convoy, and “co?te que co?te,” cross the river, he indicated Villers below Mouzon as the point of passage, and rode away. The misfortunes of the 7th Corps, also much tried, will be related later; but it may be said that they did not reach Mouzon, for their outlet from the toils proved to be the southern gate of Sedan!

[p 267]
The Surprise of the 5th Corps.

Inspired by the hope of closing with the enemy, the German Armies were astir at dawn, and soon long columns of men and guns were tramping steadily northward; but, for the present the narrative is concerned only with the Saxon 12th, the Prussian 4th, and Von der Tann’s Bavarians. These troops advanced through the forests, the Saxons near the Meuse, the 4th in the centre by Nouart and Belval, and the Bavarians, from their distant bivouac at Sommerance, upon and beyond Sommauthe. Now it was originally designed that the two Corps, on the right and centre, should attack simultaneously, and to insure this, each column, on arriving at the skirts of the forest, was directed to halt under cover until it had ascertained that the others on each flank had also gained the edge of the woods. But it turned out that the Saxons, from the start, were delayed by various obstacles which impeded not only the artillery, but the infantry. The leading division of the 4th Corps met with fewer obstructions on its route through Belval, and thus arrived first on the scene of action. On the line of march in the forest, intelligence was picked up which quickened its motions, and a squadron sent forward confirmed the statement that the French about Beaumont reposed in thoughtless security. The Corps Commander, Von Alvensleben I.,—for there were two who bore the name in this Army,—an officer ever ready to go forward, was present with the advance-guard of the division, and not likely to hold it back. So the soldiers advanced in silence. On approaching the open country, the Hussars in the front glided out of sight, and a company of J?gers crept towards the selvage of the wood, and, from a hillock near a farm, they saw, only six hundred paces distant, a French camp, and beyond [p 268] other camps. The cavalry horses were picketed, the artillery teams had not returned from seeking water, the soldiers were either resting or employed on the routine work of a camp. What should be done? Here was an absolutely unguarded Army Corps, ignorant that an enemy was within short musket range. The divisional commander had orders to await the arrival of lateral columns, but he felt that the Frenchmen might discover his unwelcome presence at any moment. He had only a brigade on the ground, yet the temptation to seize an opportunity so unexpected, was almost irresistible. He, therefore, decided to attack as soon as his brigade could deploy, and his batteries plant themselves in a favourable place. Suddenly the men in the French camp were all in motion. General von Alvensleben inferred that the proximity of his troops had been perceived, whereas the activity displayed, as we learn from De Failly, was caused by an order to fall in before starting for Mouzon. Without waiting, however, until the battalions in rear could reach the ground, Alvensleben opened fire, and the shells bursting in their camp, gave the first warning to the French that their redoubtable adversaries were upon them. General de Failly says that the grand-guards had not had time to signal the enemy’s presence, and that his own information led him to believe that the Germans had marched upon Stenay. The verdict of Marshal MacMahon upon his subordinate is that “General de Failly was surprised in his bivouac by the troops of the Saxon Crown Prince.”

The French soon recovered from their disorder, swarms of skirmishers rushed out towards the assailants, some batteries went rapidly into action; and the combined fire of shells and bullets wrought havoc among the Prussian gunners and the infantry, hitting even those on the line of march. They did not yield to the pressure; and when the [p 269] French delivered a determined attack it was repelled by volleys and independent firing. Then the French got several batteries into position on the hill side north of Beaumont; the Germans were reinforced by the arrival of guns and foot, for the other division of the Corps came up and at once deployed on the right of its comrades. At this time, a little after one o’clock, the Saxons on the right, next the Meuse, and the Bavarians on the left, who had been marching since five o’clock in the morning, had also begun to take part in the fight. King William and his vast Staff, posted on a hill off the road from Buzancy, and his son, on a similar elevation near Oches, were closely watching the battle, discernible thence in its general smoky features, at least by the King.

General de Failly had no desire to fight a regular engagement. His aim was to put his troops in order and offer as much resistance as might be required to cover his retreat upon Mouzon, distant only six miles. He, therefore, relied on his line of guns above the village, and they were effective, for some time; but he showed great apprehension lest his left, or Meuse flank, should be turned. Seeing the German lines develop and grow stronger, in men and guns, feeling the new power brought to bear by the Saxons, who, cramped for want of room, were pressed close to the river, and, hearing the Bavarian guns on his right, he made one more vigorous effort to arrest the 4th Corps. Thick lines of skirmishers, followed by supports in close order, dashed forward with such valour and impetuosity that they drove in the covering infantry and charged to within fifty paces of the guns. The danger was great, but the Germans rapidly flung everything near into the contest, gained the mastery, compelled the gallant Frenchmen to wheel about, followed them promptly, captured the southern camp, and then poured into Beaumont [p 270] itself upon all sides. But the chassepot had told, and the Germans paid heavily, as they always did and were ready to do, for their persistent courage and well-tempered audacity. With the town fell the other camps; and then, for a time, the infantry combat ceased. But the artillery advanced, as usual, and engaged in a long duel with the powerful line of batteries established by the French to facilitate the retreat of their infantry and arrest pursuit. Although not able to stand up against 150 guns, they did not retire until their infantry had got into another position between the Yoncq brook and the Meuse. Then the batteries cleverly withdrew in succession, and before the 4th Corps could advance, De Failly’s troops disappeared in the woods, and were seen no more until they were reached beyond the hills and thrust headlong into Mouzon.

While the 4th Corps was pulling itself together after the onset, De Failly had been compelled by the impenetrable wood of Givodeau to divide his forces, the left and the reserve artillery following the main route to Mouzon took post above Villemontrey, close to the Meuse, and derived support from guns and infantry which Lebrun had put into position on the high land in an elbow of the river on the right bank. The right wing hurried round the western side of the Givodeau thickets, and found a post upon a plateau beyond. In the meantime, General Lebrun had ordered two brigades of infantry, commanded by Cambriels and Villeneuve, and a cavalry division, to cross the river at Mouzon, but Marshal MacMahon, riding up, ordered back Cambriels, and all the horse except two regiments of cuirassiers. Those we shall presently meet again. The German right wing vainly endeavoured to drive De Failly from Villemontrey, and, after repeated attempts and much loss, desisted from the enterprise; but kept a strong force at hand and a large number of guns in action.

[p 271]

Meantime a singular incident had occurred to the west of Beaumont. Just as the Bavarians were about to join in the attack on the camps by throwing themselves on the French flank, they were fired on from a farm called La Thibaudine and a hamlet named Warniforêt. They were astonished because the presence of an enemy there was not even suspected. The enemy was also astonished and still more frightened. The combat was caused by a French brigade, which had wandered from its line of march. It seems that the advance brigade of Conseil Dumesnil’s division preceding the transport of the 7th Corps, a series of wagons, nine miles in length, had been ordered by MacMahon, who met them, to move by Yoncq instead of La Besace, and that, when the rear brigade came up to the point of divergence, the marker left to give information having disappeared, these unfortunate troops went forward on the great road to Beaumont. A staff officer arrived just as the action began, and he was leading the errant troops back, when the Bavarians emerged in view. The conflict which ensued was sharp, but it delayed the 7th Corps and ended in the rout of the French, who fled as best they could through Yoncq towards Mouzon. About this time Douay was at Stonne; the Uhlans of the Guard had followed him step by step, and bringing a horse battery to bear on his rear guard, had induced General Dumont to halt, deploy the brigade, and in his turn open fire; but General Douay promptly appeared and stopped the action, having made up his mind that the pressing duty of the hour was to get over the Meuse in accordance with the Marshal’s desire. So the 7th, after some hesitation, retired upon Raucourt, hoping thence to gain Villers below Mouzon; yet, being pursued by the Bavarians, they were overtaken and attacked outside Raucourt, and, hearing that the bridge was broken, they turned, [p 272] some upon Remilly, and others through Torcy into Sedan itself.
The Flight to Mouzon.

When the left wing of the 4th Corps, pressing towards the defile of the Yoncq and the slopes above it, sought to discover the French on that side, they were at first sharply punished; but, following on, they came up and closed with their adversaries. One brigade of Bavarians had been sent to the 4th Corps and moved on the left flank of the toilsome advance. For the ground was difficult, the obstacles numerous, and the French, though shattered and dispirited, still displayed a fighting front. But at length, late in the afternoon, the Germans mastered a hill-top whence adverse artillery had fired upon the assailants; and then these fairly entered the plain before Mouzon. Here, however, the French occupied an isolated hill, called Le Mont de Brune, close to and almost overhanging the Faubourg of Mouzon, from which its summit is less than a mile distant. Unluckily for them they formed front facing eastward, apparently anticipating an attack on that side; but the Germans promptly turned the flank from the south and south-west, and drove the defenders down the steep slopes towards Mouzon, capturing ten guns. The victorious forward movement brought the leading companies in front of Villeneuve’s brigade and the Cuirassiers in the plain. The Germans halted, and opened a steady fire, when suddenly they beheld the 5th Cuirassiers coming down on their left flank and rear. Captain Helmuth, who commanded the three companies exposed to this ordeal, made the left company face about in time, and then forbidding his men to form rallying squares or groups, ordered them to stand fast as they were, and only open fire when he gave the signal. The gallant French horsemen, as [p 273] was their wont, rode straight upon the infantry; but the independent firing opened on them at point blank range, broke the impetus and crushed in the head of the charging squadrons. Colonel Contenson fell mortally wounded within fifteen paces of the infantry line; and, although some fiery spirits dashed into their ranks, and one engaged in single combat with Captain Helmuth until he fell pierced by ball and bayonet, yet the whole mass of cavalry was routed with immense loss, and driven into the Meuse.

For, by this time, the wreck of De Failly’s Corps was in full retreat on all sides, and troops, artillery, transport trains, and stragglers, were crowding on towards the bridge. When his right was turned by the movement upon the Brune hill, and still further by the march of the Bavarian brigade upon Pourron, De Failly quitted his post at Villemontrey, which enabled the right division of the 4th Corps, the Saxon regiments fighting by its side, and the artillery to push on by the main road to Mouzon. After the first surprise of the Beaumont camp, the French had mainly stood, here and there, to facilitate their retreat, and the contest, which went on all the afternoon among the woods and hills and ravines, was really a running fight. The Germans had pursued with relentless pertinacity. Their soldiers had been marching all day, but they seemed to be tireless, for they never halted until the fugitives were over the Meuse, or the darkness forbade further motion. De Failly had been surprised and thrust in disorder over the river, and when the evening closed the Germans were in possession of the faubourg of Mouzon, and of the bridge at its western end. The 7th Corps, cut off from Villers, had moved, in a state bordering on panic, upon Remilly; but there they found Bonnemains’ cuirassiers, the tail of a division belonging to the 1st Corps, and a baggage column. [p 274] The Meuse had been dammed to fill the ditches of Sedan, and not only were the fords rendered useless, but the swelling stream was unusually high. Douay, halted at seven o’clock, became impatient after dark, and at ten rode down to the bridge. He found the cuirassiers engaged in passing over the feeble construction. “The horses,” writes Prince Bibesco, “affrighted, because they could not see the shaking planks hidden by the water, and shifting under their steps, moved with hesitation, their necks extended, their ears erect. Sitting upright, shrouded in their large white cloaks, the cuirassiers marched on silently, and appeared to be borne on the stream. Two fires, one at each end of the bridge, flung a ghastly light on men and horses, and, flickering on the helmets, imparted a fantastic aspect to this weird spectacle.” At length the white horsemen passed over; but when the turn of the artillery came the horses were still more recalcitrant, and the passage was so slow that, at two in the morning of the 31st, only three batteries and two regiments of foot had passed the Meuse. Douay then learned that the Marshal had ordered all the Army to assemble at Sedan, and he moved the rest of his Corps over the bridge at Torcy. These few details will give some idea of the terrible disorder which prevailed throughout the French Army.

On the evening of the 30th the Germans were upon the Meuse. The 4th Corps was before Mouzon; one Bavarian Corps at Raucourt, the other at Sommauthe; the 5th and 11th Corps about La Besace and Stonne; the 12th was near the Meuse in front of Beaumont, and the Guard just behind them; the Würtembergers were at Verrières, and the 6th Corps well out to the west at Vouziers. On this flank also were the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions threatening and watching the French communications; while the 12th Cavalry Division was astride [p 275] the Meuse at Pouilly, and one of its squadrons, evading and passing through Margueritte’s vedettes, had discovered and reported the presence of French troops on the Chiers near Carignan, and the movement of trains on the railway towards Sedan.

So ended this ominous day. The Army of the Meuse had lost 3,500 men in killed and wounded, but they had routed one French Corps, and fractions of two others, and they had captured forty-two guns. The French loss is set down at 1,800 killed and wounded, but the Germans aver that, included among the 3,000 acknowledged to be missing, there were 2,000 who bore no wounds.