CHAPTER II SOCIAL ETHICS

 “Live for others”: such is the supreme formula of positive ethics. Feeling bears witness to its justice; science discloses its far-reaching importance and its deep consequences. But this formula is not only applied in a general way to the natural society formed by men among themselves, a society in which Comte even includes animals capable of affection and of devotion, whose services deserve our gratitude. The moral law finds a precise application in the definite relations established among men by civic society, that is to say in the rights and in the mutual duties of individuals. If it be true that ethics and politics are distinct from each other, politics is none the less closely subordinated to ethics. The spiritual power does not govern; however it directs those who govern as well as those who are governed. It is this power which gives to all the sum of common beliefs and feelings which enable Society to live. Thus to ethics belongs the task of determining the principles according to which positive politics will regulate the relations between men.   Now, as a matter of fact, these relations are in a very unsettled condition to-day. Public order is unstable, revolutions are frequent, suffering is excessive. Are we to lay the blame upon public institutions? They are rather an effect than a cause. In order to understand the present condition it is necessary to grasp the law of the general evolution of humanity, and in particular that of European Society. It then320 becomes apparent that the actual disturbances proceed from the great conflict inaugurated by the French revolution. This conflict is still going on. The old régime has not yet quite disappeared, and the régime which is to take its place is not yet organised. The struggle is prolonged between the theologico-metaphysical spirit and the positive spirit, between revealed belief which is becoming weaker and demonstrated belief which is being formed, and finally between the old economic landmarks and an industrial activity whose laws have not yet been discovered.   The relations between masters and workmen are at the present time “anarchical.” The advance of industry, as it grows, oppresses the majority of those whose co-operation in it is indispensable. And the ever more strongly marked division between “brains and hands” is far more due to the political incapacity, the social thoughtlessness, and especially to the blind selfishness of the masters than to the inordinate demands of the workmen.333 The capitalists have not dreamt of organising a liberal education for the people to defend it against the seductions of the revolutionary propaganda. They seem to fear that the people should receive instruction. As far as they can, they take the place of the ancient chiefs whose social rank they covet. But they do not inherit their generosity. They do not understand that “noblesse oblige.” In this way the great masters of industry too often tend to utilise their political influence to the detriment of the public, to appropriate important monopolies and to take the advantage of the power of capital to make the claims of the masters predominate over those of the workers, without any regard for equity, since the right of coalition which is allowed to the former is refused to the latter.   Comte saw the bourgeoisie at work during Louis-Philippe’s reign, and he passes severe judgment upon it. Its political321 conceptions, he says, refer not to the aim and exercise of power, but especially to its possession. It regards the revolution as terminated by the establishment of the parliamentary régime, whereas this is only an “equivocal halting place.” A complete social reorganisation is not less feared by this middle class than by the old upper classes. Although filled with the critical spirit of the XVIII. century, even under a Republican form it would prolong a system of theological hypocrisy, by means of which the respectful submission of the masses is insured, while no strict duty is imposed upon the leaders.334 This is hard upon the proletariat, whose condition is far from improving. It “establishes dungeons for those who ask for bread.”335 It believes that these millions of men will be able to remain indefinitely “encamped” in modern society without being properly settled in it with definite and respected rights.336 The capital which it holds in its hands, after having been an instrument of emancipation, has become one of oppression. It is thus that, by a paradox difficult to uphold, the invention of machinery, which a priori, one would be led to believe, would soften the condition of the proletariat, has, on the contrary, been a new cause of suffering to them, and has made their lot a doubly hard one.337   Here, in brief, we have a formidable indictment against the middle classes, and in particular against the political economy which has nourished them. Comte has in view sometimes the classical economists of the end of the XVIII. century, sometimes their orthodox successors in the XIX. Those of the XVIII. he regards as having collaborated in the great revolutionary work. They took part in the diffusion of critical doctrines and of negative philosophy. In this capacity they have, no doubt, rendered certain services. They contributed to the decomposition of the old régime. Political economy322 had succeeded in convincing the governments themselves of their unfitness to direct the commercial and industrial movement.338   The affinities between the philosophers and the economists of the XVIII. century are evident enough: is it necessary to recall the spirit of “individualism” of the economists, and their characteristic tendency to restrict the functions of government as much as possible? Despite the efforts of a great number among them, conservatives by temperament or by political tendencies, the logical consequences of their principles were bound to come to light. Thus “the superfluity of all regular moral teaching, the suppression of all official encouragement of science and the fine arts; even the recent attacks against the fundamental institution of property find their origin in economical metaphysics.” It was with this doctrine as with the other parts of negative philosophy; after having accomplished its work of destruction, it sought to transform its critical principles into organic ones, without realising that this amounted to repudiating beforehand any positive organisation.   The famous formula, “Laissez faire, laissez passer,” is no more a real principle in political economy than liberty itself is one in politics properly so-called. Comte vigorously opposes the dogma of non-intervention. Because in some particular and secondary cases political economy has ascertained “the natural tendencies of societies in the direction of a certain necessary order, it concluded from this that any special institution is useless.” But this order is extremely imperfect. The knowledge of sociological laws will give us the power of improving it, as we already do in the case of medicine and surgery. Merely to admit the degree of order which is spontaneously established in practice is equivalent to “a solemn dismissal in the case of every difficulty which arises.” Look at the social crisis brought about by the323 development of machinery. In reply to the just and urgent claims of the workmen suddenly deprived of their means of livelihood, and unable in a day to find another, our economists can only repeat, “with merciless pedantry,” their barren aphorism about absolute industrial liberty. To all complaints they dare to answer that it is a question of time! And this to men who require food to-day! “Such a theory proclaims its own social impotence.”339   And so neither is political economy a science yet, nor, so far, are economists men of science. Originally being nearly all barristers or men of letters, they were strangers to the idea of scientific observation, to the precise notion of a natural law, and finally to the sense of what constitutes a demonstration. If we make an exception of Adam Smith and of a few others, how could they apply the positive method which they did not know to the most difficult cases of analysis? Destutt de Tracy placed political economy between logic and ethics. And this was not without reason: for it is nearer to metaphysics than to positive science. In it, work preserves its personal character, schools contend with each other, the discussions as to the elementary notions of value, of utility, etc., savour of scholasticism. The very idea of studying economical phenomena separately is not scientific, since the various “social series” are interdependent, and since in sociology more particular laws depend upon more general laws.340 There is no scientific study of economical facts unless we first look at them from the sociological point of view. We can no more isolate the laws which regulate the material existence of societies than we can describe man as an essentially calculating being, only actuated by the motive of personal interest.   The same objections naturally hold good against the adversaries of the economists, since, in general, socialists and communists have confined themselves to an analogous324 conception of their science. However, while criticising them, Comte recognises the fact that they have established some truths. Everything they say is not false. Thus, they justly claim the right for the government to intervene in economical relations. And, if it be absurd to wish to abolish private property, as certain sects demanded, it is very true that property is of a social nature, and that it is necessary to regulate it.341 To endow it with an absolute character is, says Comte, an “anti-social” theory. No property can be created, nor even transmitted, by its mere possessor without the concurrence of society. Thus always and everywhere the community has intervened in the exercise of the right of property. The tax makes the public a partner in every private fortune.   In discussing the essential problems of property, the communists (whom Comte confuses with the socialists), to-day render an important service. The very dangers called forth by the solution they propose concur in fixing the general attention upon this great subject, “without which the metaphysical empiricism and the aristocratic selfishness of the leading classes would cause it to be set aside or disdained.” Merely to state the problem without the solution with which the communists associate it, would not suffice. Our weak intellect does not fasten upon a question for long, unless a reply to it, be it true or false, which we must accept or reject is forthcoming at the same time. Moreover, are the communist “aberrations” more useless, and at bottom, more dangerous than the current illusion according to which the Revolution is ended by the establishment of the parliamentary régime?342   But, this being admitted the innovating schools have all fallen into grave mistakes. In general, being devoid of the historic sense, and on the other hand, ignoring the325 principles of social statics, they do not see that man’s action upon social phenomena is only usefully exercised within certain limits. The idea that a revolution can, in a moment, transform the régime of property and all the social conditions which depend upon it is destined to disappear, when the “positive mode of thought” shall have extended to the social phenomena in the same way as it has to all others. Then the “extravagant proposals” of the socialists will find no adherents, and the demand for what is recognised as impossible will no longer be made by anyone.343   Finally, Comte reproaches communism with its tendency to restrain individuality. This objection, coming from him, is remarkable, for it has very often been made in his own case. As an organiser of despotism, John Stuart Mill has compared him to Ignatius of Loyola. But Comte reminds us that, according to him, the collective organism, or society, differs from the individual organisms, or living beings, by the fact that in it the elements live an independent life. The problem consists in conciliating, as much as possible, this free division with the convergence of the activities. Neither of the two must be sacrificed to the other. To restrain individualities would tend to destroy the dignity of man by doing away with his responsibility, while the want of independence, and the subjection to a community indifferent to him would make life intolerable. “Such is the immense danger of all utopias which sacrifice real liberty to an anarchical equality, or even to an exaggerated fraternity.”344 On this point, positive philosophy on its own account takes up again the “decisive criticism” of communism made by our economists.   326 II.   Positive philosophy does not confine itself to refuting the orthodox economists and the socialists by the help of their own arguments. In its turn it takes up all the questions raised by them, and, for their solution, takes its stand upon the results obtained by sociology.   In the first place it states the problem of “social reorganisation” in its most general form. Socialists, in the same way as their adversaries, are only concerned with riches as if they were the only ill-divided and ill-administered social forces. But there are others. The reform of economical conditions depends, in conclusion, upon that of morals. Before all things then we must “reorganise” morals. We must determine the rights and mutual duties of citizens, and inspire everyone with the feeling of his duty and with respect for the rights of others.   The two ideas of right and of duty are not dealt with by Comte in the same manner. He accepts the idea of duty without subjecting it to a special criticism. Duty is the rule of action prescribed to each one both by feeling and by reason. It is our duty to do what we recognise as most suitable to our individual and social nature. On the contrary, the idea of right “disappears” in the positive state. The word “right” must be removed from political language, in the same way as the word “cause” is from philosophical language. They are two metaphysical notions. Everyone has duties, and towards all. No one has any right properly so-called. “The idea of right is as false as it is immoral, because it presupposes an absolute individuality.”345   These formul? called forth strong protests, particularly from M. Renouvier and his disciples. Indeed, in the constitution of civil society, they appear to neglect justice327 entirely, to establish the relations between men merely upon charity and feeling. However, if we look into it closely, Comte’s thought as is often the case, has been forced and warped, by its expression. But the comparison between the ideas of right and of cause suggested by him, satisfactorily throws a light upon his meaning.   Positive science has given up the search after causes, in order to confine itself to establishing the invariable relations between phenomena. But these relations correspond to what was formerly called causal action. They represent what was real in this supposed action. The only difference—but it is important—consists in the fact that the human mind has forsaken the absolute point of view for the relative one, and is henceforth content to establish the connection between phenomena, without imagining “connecting entities” according to Malebranche’s strong expression.   The idea of right has gone through an analogous transformation. In the same way as the idea of cause, it was theological for a long time, and then metaphysical. In antiquity it was closely allied to religion. In modern times the rights of peoples, and even the rights of individuals, are conceived according to the ancient standard of the rights of princes and masters. But, having become established by triumphing over the rights of princes, the rights of peoples and individuals ultimately rest, as they did, upon a supernatural and mystical basis. The rights which every citizen claims are the change in small coin of the absolute right formerly possessed by the sovereign who represented the whole nation. Having become metaphysical in the XVIII. century, the idea of absolute, intangible, indefeasible right, which attaches to the human person, has been most useful for the decomposition of the old régime. But, once this work has been accomplished, it cannot be made use of in the work of reorganisation any more than the other metaphysical principles. Positive philosophy328 admits nothing absolute. Everything in society is at once subject to conditions, and places conditions upon all things. Nothing is unconditional; and sociology teaches that we must go not from the individual to society, but from society to the individual.   In consequence, here again we must give up endeavouring to transform a critical principle into an organic one. Undoubtedly rights will remain, as the constant connections between phenomena subsist. But we shall cease to base these rights upon a metaphysical conception of human nature, in the same way as we have ceased to refer the connections between phenomena to metaphysical entities called causes. Instead of making individual duties consist in the respect of universal rights, we shall conceive inversely the rights of each one as the result of the duties of others towards him. In a word, duty is established before right. This principle is of the highest importance in Comte’s eyes. In it he sees an expression and a proof of the predominance of the positive over the metaphysical spirit, and of the subordination of politics to ethics. He likes to say that “the consideration of duty is bound up with the spirit of the whole.” On the contrary, the consideration of right, if it be conceived as absolute, leads to a denial of all government and of all social organisation.   The new philosophy will tend more and more to replace “the vague and stormy discussion of rights, by the calm and strict determination of respective duties.” Henceforth, the problem raised by the communists assumes a new aspect. That there should be powerful industrial masters is only an evil if they use their power to oppress the men who depend upon them. It is a good thing, on the contrary, if these masters know and fulfil their duties. It is of little consequence to popular interests in whose hands capital is accumulated, so long as the use made of it is beneficial to the social329 masses.346 Now this essential condition “depends far more upon moral than upon political measures.” The latter can undoubtedly prevent the accumulation of riches in a small number of hands, at the risk of paralysing industrial activity. But these “tyrannical” proceedings would be far less efficacious than the universal reproof inflicted by positive ethics upon a selfish use of the riches possessed. The reproof would be all the more irresistible, because of the fact that the very people who would have to submit to it could not challenge its principle, inculcated in all by the common moral education.” It is thus that in the Middle Ages, excommunication was not less feared by the princes who incurred it than it was by the peoples who witnessed it.   Once common education was established, under the direction of the spiritual power, the tyranny of the capitalist class would be no more to be feared. Rich men would consider themselves as the moral guardians of public capital. It is not here a question of charity. Those who possess will have the “duty” of securing, first, education and then work for all.   These ideas seem perhaps paradoxical and chimerical. But, says Comte, this is because modern society has not yet got its system of morality. Industrial relations which have become immensely developed in it are abandoned to a dangerous empiricism, instead of being systematised according to moral laws. War, more or less openly declared, alone regulates the relations between capital and labour. In a normal state of humanity these relations, on the contrary, are “organised.” Strength does not generate oppression. Every citizen is a “public functionary,” whose well-defined functions determine at once his obligations and his claims (that is to say his rights). Property is a function like any other, and not a privilege. It serves for the formation and administration of capital by means of which each generation330 prepares the work of the next. Those who hold it must not turn it from its public use to their own individual advantage.347   In the same way as the capitalists, the workers are public functionaries, and they perform a no less important service. Independently of their salary, they are deserving social gratitude. Our customs already admit of this feeling in the case of the liberal professions in which the salary does not dispense with gratitude. This feeling will have to be extended to all work which contributes to the common weal. The service of humanity, says Comte, is a gratuitous one. The salary, whatever it may be, only pays for the material part in every office. It serves to repair the consumption demanded by the organ and the function. As to the essence of service itself it allows of no other reward than the very satisfaction of performing it, and the gratitude which it arouses.348   Consequently in a “truly organised” society (note this expression which M. de Bonald often uses), the vulgar distinction between public and private functionaries is destined to disappear. As, in an army, even the private soldier has his own dignity which comes from the close solidarity of the military organisation, and from this fact, that all share the same honour in it; so, when positive education has made evident to all the part played by each one in the social work, professions which are humblest to-day will become ennobled.349 The industrial régime of to-day, which shows us little else than the conflict of rival egoisms, is an anarchical régime, or, to put it better, an “absence of régime.”   Modern society has not yet got its morals. It will form them gradually, in the same way as military society did. Military life, more than any other, is ruled by the predominating selfish inclinations. Nevertheless, as it could only be331 developed by the spirit of union, this condition alone sufficed for it to determine admirable devotion.350 Why should it not be the same in industrial life which rests upon the peaceful and constructing instinct? Otherwise, if the present “anarchy” of morals were to last, modern society would remain below the level of the Middle Ages, which really was organised by its spiritual power. It would even be below the level of military societies. What would be the use of substituting monopoly to conquest, and a despotism based upon the right of the richest to the despotism resting upon the right of the strongest?351   Everything then depends upon the common moral education, which itself depends upon the establishment of a spiritual power. The superiority of the positive doctrine lies in the fact that it has restored this power. The innovating schools all wish to secure normal education and regular work for the proletariat. But they want both at once, or work before education. Positivism wishes to organise education first.352   Naturally, in positive education duties will be presented in their social aspect. Thus the elementary virtues of temperance, of chastity, etc., are recommended by positive morality;—but not from the point of view of their usefulness to the individual. Even if “an exceptionally constituted nature should shield the individual from the consequences of intemperance or debauchery,” soberness and continence would be no less strictly required of him as being indispensable for the fulfilment of his social duties.353 In the same way, the object of domestic morality is not to form “a selfishness shared by several,” but to develop the sympathetic affections which, from the family will gradually extend to the social group, and then to humanity. The principle is to get man into the habit of subjecting himself to humanity, even in his smallest actions, and in all his thoughts.332 Once this point is reached, modern society will spontaneously become organised and the positive régime will of itself be established.