SECTION XXVI: CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF FUENTES DE O?ORO.
MAY 5th, 1811

Masséna’s attempt to ‘take the bull by the horns’—for the phrase used at Bussaco may well be repeated for the attack on Fuentes village—had failed with loss. It was clear that he had hit upon a strong point in Wellington’s well-hidden line, and he had paid dearly for his brutal methods. It remained to be seen whether he might not also find, as at Bussaco, some way of turning his adversary’s position by a wide flank movement. Down-stream the ground looked very impracticable, and the ravine of the Dos Casas seemed to grow more and more formidable as it neared its junction with the Agueda. The Marshal therefore ordered Montbrun to make reconnaissances in every direction towards the right, on the side of Pozo Bello and Nava de Aver, and to report on the roads and the character of the ground, as well as on the disposition of the flank-guards of the enemy. The whole of the 4th of May was taken up in this fashion—there being no shots fired save in Fuentes de O?oro itself, when Ferey’s troops in the morning exchanged a lively fusillade across the brook with the British regiments occupying the main block of the village. The firing died down before noon, neither side being inclined to take the offensive[396].

Montbrun’s reports came in during the afternoon, and were very important. The enemy, he said, had no more than a screen of cavalry pickets to the south of Fuentes, with a single detached battalion in the village of Pozo Bello. The end of his line had been found at Nava de Aver; it was composed only of the[p. 316] guerrilla band of Julian Sanchez. There was nothing to prevent a frontal attack on Pozo Bello by infantry, though the place was enclosed in woods and somewhat difficult to approach. There was accessible ground between Pozo Bello and Nava where cavalry might act, nor was the morass by the latter village, on which the extreme right of the Allies rested, impassable.

On this report Masséna based his new scheme of operations[397]. He resolved to turn Wellington’s right with three infantry divisions and nearly the whole of his cavalry, while detaining him in his present position by attacks more or less pressed home. The striking-force was to be composed of Marchand’s and Mermet’s divisions of the 6th Corps with Solignac’s division of the 8th Corps in support, and of all the horsemen save the skeleton squadrons attached to the 2nd and 6th Corps, viz. Montbrun’s division of dragoons and the cavalry brigades of Fournier, Wathier, and Lepic, a mass of 17,000 infantry and 3,500 sabres. Reynier, opposite Wellington’s left, was to make demonstrations, which were to be turned into a serious attack only if the Allies showed weakness in this direction. But in the centre there was to be a vigorous onslaught launched against Fuentes de O?oro, when the turning movement was seen to be in progress to the south. For this, not only Ferey’s division, already in position opposite the village, was told off, but also Drouet’s two divisions of the 9th Corps. The place was to be carried at all costs, while Wellington was busy on his right, and a breach was thus to be made in the line of the Allies at the same moment that their wing was turned. Fourteen thousand infantry were concentrated opposite Fuentes for this purpose.

After dusk had fallen the French army made the preliminary movements required by the new plan. Montbrun’s cavalry rode out far to the south, one brigade to the foot of the hill of Nava de Aver, the others to the ground east of Pozo Bello. To this latter point Marchand’s and Mermet’s infantry proceeded, with Solignac’s division following them. Drouet brought the 9th Corps to the ground formerly occupied by the 6th Corps, while Reynier drew in a little southward, leaving one division opposite Fort Concepcion, but moving the other to the position in front of Alameda lately occupied by Solignac. A large detachment[p. 317] of sappers went out with Montbrun, to mend the paths across the morass which his flanking brigade had to cross.
Map of the battle of Fuentes De O?oro, first day.

Enlarge  FUENTES de O?ORO.
Positions on the first day (May 3rd. 1811).

Wellington had not been unaware that the want of movement on Masséna’s part during the 4th probably covered some design against his flanks, and since his left flank was practically impregnable, he suspected that his right might be in danger, a suspicion which was made into certainty by reconnaissances which detected the French stirring among the marshy woods. The whole of his cavalry was thrown out in this direction, but the four regiments could only cover the ground inadequately, and being scattered in squadrons along three miles of front were weak everywhere. The most serious movement that he made was to detach the 7th Division as an outlying force to cover his right: two battalions were put into the village of Pozo Bello[398] and the wood in front of it; the remaining seven occupied a position on the slope to the west of that little place. This was a somewhat dangerous expedient—the 7th Division was the smallest and weakest unit in Wellington’s army—it only contained two British battalions[399], and these were new-comers just landed at Lisbon. It was thrown out two miles from the main position, and on open ground not presenting any particular advantage for defence—indeed, if the enemy should attack in strength, it would be compelled to act as a mere detaining and observing rather than a fighting force. For though it was well placed for foiling a mere attempt to turn the Fuentes position by a small detachment and a short lateral movement[400], yet if the enemy’s flanking man?uvre were made by a large body and far afield, it was clear that the 7th Division would have to retreat in haste towards the main position. This being so, one wonders that Wellington did not select one of his best divisions—the 3rd or the Light—for such a responsible post. But he apparently did not foresee the whole plan of Masséna. ‘Imagining,’ he writes in his dispatch describing the battle, ‘that the enemy would endeavour to obtain possession of Fuentes de O?oro and of the ground occupied by the troops[p. 318] behind that village, by crossing the Dos Casas at Pozo Velho, I moved the 7th Division under Major-General Houston to the right, in order to protect, if possible, that passage.’ But Masséna was set not only on attacking Pozo Bello, but on turning it, and taking it in the rear by a wide sweep of his whole disposable cavalry force. Over 20,000 men were on the move, and Houston had but 4,000 infantry, with 1,400 horse to guard his flank.

The other preparation which Wellington made for a possible battle on the 5th was to draw back the Light Division at dusk from the left wing to its original position behind Fuentes village in reserve. He also withdrew the numerous light companies which had formed the original garrison of that place, and left there only two battalions, the 1/71st and 1/79th, with the 2/24th to support them at the top of the hill.

The fighting on the 5th of May began very early. Just at daybreak the extreme right flank of Wellington’s cavalry screen was attacked by the outermost of the enemy’s turning columns, composed of two regiments of Montbrun’s dragoons[401]. This took place under the hill of Nava de Aver, where Julian Sanchez with his guerrilleros had been posted on the 3rd, while two squadrons of the 14th Light Dragoons had been moved up to his support on the night of the 4th. The guerrilleros kept a bad look-out, and in the dusk of the morning were surprised by the enemy—they drew off hastily to the south without making any resistance. Not so the two British squadrons under Major Brotherton[p. 319] of the 14th, who fought a running fight for two miles, showing front repeatedly, till their flank was on each occasion turned by the vastly superior numbers of the enemy. They were driven in at last upon Pozo Bello, where lay two battalions of the 7th Division, whose extreme right picket, placed in a wood, stopped the enemy’s pursuit by a volley. The main body of the French cavalry seems to have started a little later than the flanking force which assailed Nava de Aver, as its leading regiments only attacked the British cavalry screen to the right of that village some time after Brotherton’s squadrons had begun to be driven in. Here the line of observation was furnished by a squadron of the 16th Light Dragoons and another of the 1st Hussars of the King’s German Legion, who drew together, and gallantly, but rather rashly, attempted to stop the enemy’s advance at a defile between two woods. The squadron of the 16th, charging into a mass of the enemy, suffered heavily and had its commanding officer captured[402]. The Germans then took their turn, but were also driven back with loss. The broken troops had to fall back in all haste till, like Brotherton’s detachment, they came in upon the flank of the village of Pozo Bello, and formed up there. The French cavalry, extending over the slopes when they were clear of the woods, appeared in overpowering numbers, and showed an evident intention to turn the right flank of the British force, which they were strong enough to do even when the whole twelve squadrons of Wellington’s cavalry, falling back from various points of the line which they had been observing, were concentrated on the flank of the woods and enclosures of Pozo Bello.

Up to this moment, an hour after daybreak, only French cavalry had been seen, but the infantry now joined in. The two divisions of Marchand and Mermet had been moved in the night to a point opposite Pozo Bello: when the skirmishing to the right of that place was growing hot, the leading division, that of Marchand, charged in upon the wood in front of the[p. 320] village, cleared out of it the skirmishers of the 85th regiment and the 2nd Ca?adores, and then stormed the village also, driving out of it the two battalions, which vainly tried to maintain themselves there against the crushing superiority of the attack. As they were emerging from among the houses in great disorder, they were fallen upon and ridden over by a French light cavalry regiment, which had pushed round their flank unobserved. Both battalions suffered heavily: between them they lost over 150 men, of whom 85 were killed and wounded and some 70 unwounded prisoners. It is marvellous that the two corps were not entirely destroyed—but they were saved by a charge of two squadrons of the German Hussars, and succeeded in forming up with promptness and moving away in the direction of the main body of the 7th Division, which was visible a mile to the west, on the opposite slope of the bottom in which Pozo Bello lies.

The next hour was a very dangerous one: the French infantry divisions, emerging from the captured village and the woods, began to form up in heavy columns, threatening both to attack the Fuentes de O?oro position on its right flank, and to cut in between the isolated 7th Division and the rest of the army. Montbrun’s cavalry, displaying regiment after regiment, came on in hot pursuit of the troops that had escaped from Pozo Bello and of the British squadrons that were covering them. They were already outflanking the 7th Division on the right, by means of the detachment which had come from Nava de Aver.

Wellington was surprised at the strength of the turning force—its numbers were far greater than he had foreseen, and he was forced to take a new resolution and form a fresh battle-order. The most important thing was to save the 7th Division from being cut off, and to bring it back into line with the rest of the army. Accordingly he directed a chosen unit—the Light Division, now once more under the indomitable Craufurd, who had joined on the preceding night—to advance from its position in reserve behind Fuentes, and to move out along the slope of the low heights to the right, so as to come into touch with Houston and the cavalry, and to help them to get home. Meanwhile the rest of the centre of the army—the 1st and 3rd[p. 321] Divisions and Ashworth’s Portuguese[403], formed a new line of battle, en potence to the original right flank of the British position. They were drawn up along the dominating ground between the rocky hillocks that overhang the village of Fuentes and the descent into the valley of the Turon brook. This is the last of the high ground—to the right of it (as has been before mentioned) the watershed between the Dos Casas and the Turon ceases to be composed of a commanding ridge, and sinks into gentle slopes[404]. Thus Fuentes de O?oro became the projecting point of a battle-order thrown back at right angles to the original position—where the 5th and 6th Divisions still continued to occupy their old post opposite Reynier. Formations en potence are proverbially dangerous, because of the liability of the angle to be enfiladed and crushed by artillery fire. But in this case the danger was less than usual, since Wellington for once in his life had more guns than the French, and the lie of the plateau was such that the lower parts of Fuentes village might be enfiladed, but not the ground above it by the church and rocks, nor the plateau behind it, where the ground occupied by the 3rd Division was out of sight of the French on the lesser heights. Indeed, the holding of the houses in the bottom was of comparatively little importance to Wellington, so long as he kept his grip on the upper end of the straggling village. Here, on the double-headed height crowned by the church and the rocks, was the real pivot of the position.

Wellington had ample time to move the 1st and 3rd Divisions with Ashworth’s Portuguese into the new position—none of them had much over a mile to march, since all had been concentrated behind Fuentes when the alarm came. The enemy’s approach was slow, partly because his infantry had to disentangle itself from the houses of Pozo Bello and the surrounding wood, and to form in a fresh front, partly because his cavalry became wholly absorbed in a running fight with the Light and[p. 322] 7th Divisions, and had no attention to spare for any other direction.

Masséna’s plan, when he had got his left wing out of the woods, soon became clear. He was intending to break in with his cavalry between the 7th Division and the rest of the army, while Marchand and Mermet were to attack the new front of the 1st and 3rd Divisions, and the 9th Corps, with Ferey’s division, was to smash in the projecting point of Wellington’s position, by storming Fuentes village and the height behind it. Reynier, as on the 3rd of May, was to demonstrate against the allied left, but not to attack till success in the centre seemed assured. From the course of the action it is evident that the Marshal’s main intention was to beat Wellington by hard fighting, and to break up his army—not merely to man?uvre him into a bad strategical position and to cut his more available lines of communication, so as to force him into a difficult and dangerous retreat. If the last had been Masséna’s intention—as some authors suggest—the course of the battle would have been different. But he made no attempt to send cavalry to intercept the roads to Castello Bom, still less to detach infantry against Wellington’s rear. Having turned his enemy’s flank, and forced him to make a new front, he showed no further desire to man?uvre, but proceeded to batter away at the troops in front of him, trusting that numbers and impetus would secure him the victory.

The fight fell for some time into two absolutely distinct sections—an attempt by Drouet’s and Ferey’s three divisions to carry Fuentes de O?oro village and break Wellington’s centre, and an attempt to cut up, by the cavalry arm alone, the 7th Division and its attendant squadrons, before they could be succoured and drawn back into Wellington’s new line of defence. It was only after some time that these two combats became joined, by an attempt—which was never pressed home—to attack that part of the British position which lay to the right rear of Fuentes de O?oro.

The fighting west of Pozo Bello may be taken first, as it was a logical continuation of the engagement in the early morning. Here Montbrun had under his hand four cavalry brigades—those of Wathier, Fournier, Cavrois, and Ornano—about 2,700 sabres,[p. 323] with Lepic’s 800 guard cavalry as his reserve—though, as it turned out in the end, the use of that reserve was to be denied him. In front of him were the two battalions recently evicted from Pozo Bello, with the British cavalry brigades of Slade and Arentschildt (about 1,400 sabres) and Bull’s horse-artillery troop, which had drawn up to protect the retreat of the routed battalions towards the main body of the 7th Division. General Houston with that force (one British battalion, two foreign, and four Portuguese battalions[405]) was engaged in taking up new ground, on the slope which is separated from Pozo Bello by the shallow trough forming the valley of the Dos Casas brook. Montbrun’s object was, of course, to break the British horsemen, and then to fall upon and destroy the shaken infantry which they were protecting, before they could cross the valley. There resulted a very fierce and long-sustained cavalry combat, infinitely creditable to the four British regiments, who had to fight a detaining action against numbers about double their own. They were bound to retire in the end—and indeed had no other intention—but it was their duty to hold off the enemy till the infantry behind them had got into order. This was done, though at great cost, the regiments retiring by alternate squadrons, while the rear squadron at each change of front charged, often winning a temporary and partial success over the enemy in its immediate front, but always forced to give back as the French reserve came up. ‘When we charged,’ wrote a participant in this long combat, ‘they would often turn their horses, and our men shouted in the pursuit—but go which way they might, we were but scattered drops amid their host, and could not possibly arrest their progress. We had again to go about and retire[406].’ The British cavalry, though losing heavily, never got out of hand, and could be still used as efficient units down to the end of this phase of the battle. Of their total casualty list of 157 nearly all must have been lost in this hard work; it is noticeable that only one officer and four men were taken prisoners, a sufficient proof that there was no such rout as[p. 324] French accounts describe—for a rout always implies a serious loss in ‘missing.’

After a running fight, the British cavalry was driven back on to the 7th Division, which (now joined by the two detached battalions) was drawn up on the best position that Houston could select on the slope above the valley: his centre was in a projecting angle among some rocks which crop up in the generally bare hillside—his wings thrown back, and partly covered by stone walls forming the boundaries of meadows. The much-tried British squadrons, clearing off to the side, took position on the left rear of the infantry, leaving the 7th Division in face of the now rather confused mass of Montbrun’s horsemen, whose order was none the better for the long and well-contested combat in which they had been engaged. The French general made a serious attempt to break into the 7th Division: while skirmishers demonstrated against its front, and a light battery just sent forward by Masséna shelled its centre, a brigade of dragoons turned its right wing and tried to roll it up. This attack was foiled by the Chasseurs Britanniques, who, drawn up behind a long stone wall, had apparently escaped Montbrun’s notice; receiving a staggering volley at close range, just when they supposed that they had come upon an unprotected flank, the advancing squadrons fell back in confusion. Another charge, made against the 51st, was also beaten off by musketry[407]. The French then came to a stand—it was clear that they wanted infantry if they were to get any advantage over the 7th Division, which was now well settled down into its position. But Marchand’s and Mermet’s battalions had not followed Montbrun across the valley, but had begun to march straight against the centre of Wellington’s new line, west of Fuentes de O?oro.

At this moment a new force came upon the scene; Craufurd and the Light Division were at hand, marching along the higher slope of the watershed between the Turon and the Dos Casas, in order to connect with the 7th Division. But Craufurd had not come to form up and hold the ground where Houston was already engaged. Wellington’s orders were that the 7th Division should move to its rear, cross the Turon, and prolong, to the[p. 325] west of that stream, the new line already formed by the 1st and 3rd Divisions. It was to make this movement covered by the Light Division and the cavalry, who were to hold the slope till Houston was well on his way and out of danger. They were then to retire behind the 1st Division. This was a dangerous task for Craufurd and his men, but Wellington had selected them precisely because he knew that they were to be trusted. While Montbrun was busy rearranging his disordered brigades, Houston slipped down the reverse slope of the hillside where he had been lying, crossed the Turon, and finally drew up with one brigade (Sontag’s) on the well-marked heights west of that stream, and the other (Doyle’s Portuguese) in the village of Freneda, a mile further to the right. Thus Wellington had once more an outlying flank-guard, covering the roads which lead to the Coa and the Bridge of Castello Bom. With the exception of the two battalions cut up at the opening of the fight, the 7th Division had suffered very slightly—apparently the French cavalry had not harmed it, but their attached battery had caused some casualties, which came in all to no more than 90 men[408] out of the 3,800 in the seven battalions which had not fought at Pozo Bello.

On the departure of the 7th Division all the peril and responsibility now fell on Craufurd and the already much-tried cavalry, who had to make their way back for a full mile along the open slope of the hillside, to join their comrades in the new position south of Fuentes. Montbrun, though he had failed in his attack on infantry in position, thought that he ought to have better fortune against men retreating over a rolling upland, so urged the pursuit with great energy. Craufurd formed his men in battalion squares, save a few companies of the rifles and Ca?adores, whom he threw into thickets and enclosures to the right and left, where he thought them safe against horsemen.[p. 326] The main body retreated in a line of squares, with the cavalry and the battery of horse artillery in the intervals. Whenever the French came forward, the guns played upon them, and the British cavalry charged by squadrons to check the onslaught. So beautifully was the retreat managed, that Montbrun never got a chance to charge the infantry at advantage. ‘The steadiness and regularity with which the troops performed their movement, the whole time exposed to a cannonade, and followed across a plain by a numerous cavalry, ready to pounce on the squares if the least disorder should be detected, was acknowledged by hundreds of unprejudiced spectators (who witnessed it from the heights) to have been a masterpiece of military evolution. ‘We sustained a very trifling loss from the cannonade[409],’ writes one Light Division officer. Another (Napier himself) in more stirring phrases tells how ‘many times Montbrun threatened to charge Craufurd’s squares, but always found them too dangerous to meddle with. They appeared but as specks, with close behind them 5,000 [read 3,500] horsemen, trampling, bounding, shouting for the word to charge. Fifteen guns were up with the French cavalry, the eighth corps[410] was in order of battle behind them, the woods on their right were filled with Loison’s skirmishers, and if that general, pivoting upon Fuentes, had come forth with the 6th Corps, while Drouet assailed the village and the cavalry made a general charge, the loose crowd of non-combatants and broken troops would have been violently dashed against the 1st Division, to intercept its fire and break its ranks, and the battle might have been lost[411].’ But Montbrun knew as well as Craufurd that intact infantry of good quality cannot be broken when it is securely formed in square, and any attempt to molest the Light Division by artillery fire was checked by the self-sacrificing efforts of the British cavalry and guns, who fought their best to keep off the enemy. Bull’s guns were incessantly unlimbering and firing a few rounds in the intervals of the squares, and then retreating rapidly to a new position. On the only occasion when a French battery[p. 327] got close up it was charged in front, with desperate gallantry, by a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, who suffered terribly, but won the necessary minutes for the square to which it was neighbour to get out of range[412]. At last the whole retiring force, horse and foot, came into Wellington’s lines, with the French close in their rear, and found safety with the 1st Division. Two incidents marked the last moments of the retreat: at one point occurred an episode which Napier has immortalized, with some inaccuracy of detail, in one of his most brilliant ‘purple passages.’ Captain Norman Ramsay, with two guns of Bull’s troop, had halted, not for the first time, for a shot or two at the pursuing cavalry; lingering a moment too long, he found himself cut off, just as he had limbered up, by a swarm of chasseurs, who rode in from the flank. But he put his guns to the gallop, and, charging himself in front of them with the mounted gunners, was cutting his way through the French when he was brought off by friends. On one side a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons under Brotherton, on the other a squadron of the Royals, had turned back when they saw the artillery in danger. They fell upon the chasseurs before Ramsay had suffered any hurt, and saved him and his guns, which were brought into the lines of the 1st Division amid loud cheers from all who had seen the affair[413].

[p. 328]A little to the left of the point where this happy escape took place there was an episode of a less fortunate kind. The skirmishing line of the 1st Division was extended along the foot of the slope on which its brigades were arrayed. When the rolling mass composed of the Light Division squares, their attendant cavalry, and the French in hot pursuit, drew near to the position, the officer in charge of the pickets of the Guards’ brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Hill of the 3rd Guards) directed them to close up into solid order, for safety’s sake: this they did, forming a small square. In this formation they beat off the rather disorderly charge of the French horse; but Colonel Hill then very unwisely extended them again, and thus exposed them in the most dangerous order to a second charge of a French regiment (13th Chasseurs) which came in from the side after the main attack was over. The three companies were taken in flank, rolled up, and very badly mauled, sixty or eighty men being killed or wounded, and Hill himself with another officer and nineteen men being taken prisoners[414]. The rest had time to club together and defend themselves, till they were rescued by the charge of a[p. 329] squadron of the Royals under Colonel Clifton and a troop of the 14th Light Dragoons, which brought off most of the survivors. The total loss was about 100 men[415].

This was only one of several partial attacks made by the French cavalry against the front of Wellington’s new position[416]. Montbrun seems to have thought that he could continue to press the Allies—not recognizing that he had hitherto had to do with troops voluntarily retiring, but had now run against a battle-line which intended to stand. Indeed, he wished to try the effect of a general charge against the front of the 1st Division, and with that object sent orders to his reserve, Lepic’s brigade of Guard cavalry, to come to the front, and head an advance, which the rallied squadrons of his main body would support. Lepic, however, refused to move, saying that personally he was only too ready to attack, but that he had received specific orders not to use his brigade save at the direct command of his immediate superior, Marshal Bessières[417]. While the Marshal was being sought (he was ultimately found, after much delay, behind Pozo Bello), the moment which Montbrun supposed suitable for a charge passed away.

With this episode the advance of Montbrun’s cavalry ended, frittering itself away on the edge of the new position of the Allies. Its total effect had been to roll in the flanking force which Wellington had thrown out, and to gain some three miles of ground. The loss of the British had been appreciable, but can[p. 330] hardly be called severe—under 250 in the 7th Division, about 150 in the cavalry, and 200 in the 1st Division. Montbrun’s squadrons on their side had 359 casualties, to which may be added perhaps a hundred in Marchand’s division of the 6th Corps, which fought in the attack on Pozo Bello. The strategical advantage obtained by forcing Wellington to throw back his right wing, and to leave the roads towards Castello Bom exposed to the possibility of flanking cavalry raids, was considerable. But it was less important than it appeared, since the mere threatening of his communications was useless, unless he could be forced or man?uvred out of his position; and this was not to be done. He himself saw this clearly, writing in his dispatch which describes the battle: ‘I had occupied Po?o Velho and that neighbourhood, in hopes that I should be able to maintain the communication across the Coa by Sabugal, &c., as well as to provide for the blockade of Almeida, which objects, as was now obvious, were become incompatible with each other. I therefore abandoned that which was the less important[418].’ He then proceeds to show how his new position still covered the blockade of Almeida, and (by means of the troops placed beyond the Turon) rendered it hard for the enemy to make any real attempt towards Castello Bom—since this could not be done save by an isolated detachment. Indeed, Masséna had still to beat the allied army, and the preliminary operations now ended had done nothing more than thrust it back into its fighting position.

That, according to Masséna’s design, the second act of the battle was to consist in a vigorous attempt to break Wellington’s new line, is clear from his own dispatch. And the point to be pierced was the projecting angle of its centre, in, and to the right of, Fuentes village. Here the attack was to be concentric and enveloping, Ferey’s division and the two divisions of the 9th Corps being intended to storm the village, after which Marchand’s and Mermet’s divisions, supported by Solignac’s, were to assail the heights to its south-west, where Picton and Spencer were now in line. Six of the eight infantry divisions of the French army were to attack on a front of not much over a mile. This was a powerful combination, but the position which it was to assail was also[p. 331] very strong. The village, with its barricaded streets and its tiers of houses trending up the hill, was susceptible of indefinite defence. The hillside above it and to its right was a perfect fighting-ground—with the ravine in its front, fine artillery emplacements along the sky-line, and a flat plateau behind, on which the main line and the reserves could stand sheltered, till the moment when they were required to deal with an infantry attack.

Masséna’s plan was to storm the village first, and then, when Ferey and Drouet should have pushed through it, and have got a lodgement on the plateau, to deliver the frontal attack with the other three divisions. He did not intend Marchand and Mermet to move till the projecting angle of Wellington’s line was turned and broken in by the success of the other attack. For to send forward these two divisions of the 6th Corps for an assault on the fine position opposite them, while it was held by intact troops with their flanks properly covered, would have been to invite a repetition of Bussaco. The plateau was held by a perfectly adequate force, the four brigades of the 1st Division (minus three battalions detached to hold Fuentes de O?oro[419]), Ashworth’s Portuguese brigade, and the whole 3rd Division, over 13,000 men, on a short front, while the Light Division had now returned to take its place in reserve. Wellington had these troops drawn up in a double line, the 1st Division next the Turon, Ashworth’s brigade in the centre, and the 3rd Division above Fuentes, whose defence it was to feed, if necessary, by detaching battalions from its second line, which was formed by Mackinnon’s brigade. Owing to the numerical inferiority of the French artillery, Wellington had also been able to concentrate a larger number of guns (six batteries) on the critical point of the battlefield than his enemy could bring against him, so that the ‘artillery preparation,’ to maul his line before a general attack, was bound to fail. The French guns were overpowered in the contest.

[p. 332]It must not be supposed that Masséna waited for the arrival of Marchand’s and Mermet’s infantry in front of the position before commencing his attack. The troops opposite Fuentes had been ordered to storm the village when Montbrun’s operations had begun to develop successfully, but ‘sans rien hasarder[420],’ i. e. they were not to move if the attempt to turn the British right failed. But when the cavalry were seen sweeping the hillsides beyond Pozo Bello, and driving the enemy before them, the attack on Fuentes was begun by Ferey’s division, which was already in possession of the few houses on the east side of the Dos Casas brook. The assault commenced at about two hours after dawn, when the combat was already in full progress to the south, by a brisk attack which drove the defenders of the village (the 71st and 79th) out of its lower portion. Two companies of the latter regiment, barricaded in some buildings near the water, were completely surrounded and forced to surrender, after all their officers had been wounded. Ninety-four men were taken prisoners. The remainder of this Highland battalion and of its countrymen of the 71st rallied in the upper end of the village, and when joined by the regiment in reserve (the 2/24th) came forward again, and drove the French into the lower houses by the river. The fight came to a standstill for a moment, Ferey’s division (which had already suffered so severely on the 3rd) being now a spent force so far as initiative went.

[p. 333]But Drouet, who had been told to give Ferey his best support, then fed the fight with three bataillons d’élite, composed of the eighteen grenadier companies of his two divisions[421]. These picked troops, who were mistaken for men of the Imperial Guard by their opponents because of their bearskins and tall plumes, came on with great courage, and cleared all the middle slopes of the village, driving the garrison up to the summit of the double-headed hill, near the church and the rocks. The fighting was very deadly to both sides, but more so to the French, who had to dislodge an obstinate foe from barricaded houses and lines of stone walls. It ended in the establishment of the attacking force on the brink of the summit, but further the grenadiers could not go—the head of the village and the plateau above it was still maintained by the 71st, 79th, and 24th, and Wellington began to feed the defending force by drafting into the upper end of Fuentes, one after another, the light companies of several brigades of the 1st and 3rd Divisions—the same detachments who had defended the village upon May 3—in succession those of L?we’s German brigade, of Howard’s brigade, of Ashworth’s and Power’s Portuguese, were sent to the critical point. The whole of the 6th Ca?adores followed.

But the progress of the attack had been so far encouraging that at this moment—about noon—Drouet resolved to finish the affair by putting in heavy supports from Conroux’s and Claparéde’s divisions for a final blow[422], which should heave the French line up on to the plateau, clear the allied troops out of the last few houses of the village, and definitively break Wellington’s line at its projecting point. Eight or ten fresh battalions charged across the brook in column, through the narrow streets encumbered by dead and wounded, and, ascending the slope, drove their enemies out of the church and the rocks beside it. This was the critical moment of the day—the only one at which Wellington lost possession of the whole of the advanced post which so perfectly defended his centre.

‘Such a series of attacks,’ writes an eye-witness[423], ‘constantly supported by fresh troops, required exertions more than human[p. 334] to withstand: every effort had been made to maintain the post, but efforts, however great, have their limits. Our soldiers had now been engaged in this unequal contest for upwards of eight hours; the heat was excessive, and their ammunition was nearly expended. The town presented a shocking sight: our Highlanders lay dead in heaps, while the other regiments, though less remarkable in dress, were scarcely so in the number of their slain. The French grenadiers, with their immense caps and gaudy plumes, lay in piles of ten and twenty together—some dead, others wounded, with barely strength sufficient to move, their exhausted state and the weight of their cumbrous accoutrements making it impossible for them to crawl out of the dreadful fire of grape and round shot which the enemy poured into the town. The Highlanders had been driven to the churchyard at the very top of the village, and were fighting with the French grenadiers across the graves and tombstones. The 9th French Light Infantry (the leading battalion of Conroux’s division) had penetrated as far as the church, and were preparing to debouch upon the rear of our centre.’

This part of the British army, the second or reserve line of the 3rd Division—whose front line was nearer the edge of the position, facing Marchand—was composed of Mackinnon’s brigade, the 1/45th, 74th, and 1/88th. On these troops devolved the responsibility of stopping the gap, by recovering the church and the head of the village. The moment for their action had evidently come. Mackinnon sent for leave to charge to Wellington by Sir Edward Pakenham, who galloped back in a few minutes, for he had found his chief only a few yards away, watching for the crisis. ‘He says you may go—come along[424],’ was the prompt reply, and Mackinnon moved down with the 74th and 88th in column of sections, left in front, leaving the 45th in reserve on his old position.

There was a fearful clash by the church at the mouth of the village street, between the 88th, the leading British regiment, and the 4th battalion of the 9th Léger at the head of Conroux’s column. They met front to front, both in column, and are said[p. 335] to have fought with the bayonet for some moments—the rarest thing in war; it was only in a street combat like this that such a chance could happen. After a sharp bicker the French battalion gave way and turned back. At the same moment the 74th charged down another lane which led into the village, and all the broken remnants of the Highland regiments and the light companies cheered and advanced among the lanes and houses. The enemy yielded at every point, seeing their main column beaten back, and the advance of the British line swept the whole village as far as the brook: some of the pursuers, going too far, were killed even on its further side. It was impossible to maintain the houses near the water, which were too much exposed to the fire of the French artillery on the opposite bank. But the 74th and 88th made a firm lodgement in the middle and upper parts of the village, and were not molested by any further attempt on the part of Drouet to expel them, though his guns made their position sufficiently uncomfortable. The commander of the 9th Corps contented himself with bringing forward his last intact battalions to the front, to cover the routed masses, while they were getting into order again to the rear of their original position.

The attempt to storm Fuentes had failed with loss, and by about two o’clock the decisive fighting was over. The 9th Corps had lost 835 men in the street-fighting, Ferey’s division at least 400 more[425]. On the part of the defenders, the 71st and 79th, the original garrison of the village, had 458 casualties, including 119 prisoners taken at the moment of the first storm—this was a loss of 30 per cent., as they had 1,419 officers and men on the field. Cameron, the colonel of the 79th, was shot from a house during the last victorious charge. The 74th and 88th, who finally recovered Fuentes by their decisive charge, lost[p. 336] only 116 men in doing so. The 2/24th, with the light companies and Ca?adores who had formed the earlier reinforcements, seem to have had about 160 casualties, but it is impossible to separate the losses of the light companies in the village from those of the battalions to which they belonged, who were drawn up in the main position and suffered certain casualties there. On the whole the defenders of Fuentes seem to have lost about 800 men, its assailants about 1,300, out of the 4,000 and the 7,000 men whom they respectively engaged within it: such is the value of the defensive, even when the fighting comes to close quarters among houses and enclosures.

Masséna had evidently considered the capture of the village of Fuentes as the necessary preliminary for a general attack upon Wellington’s line. While Ferey and Drouet had been making their last efforts, Marchand’s and Mermet’s divisions had been halted before the position of Picton’s and Ashworth’s troops, while Montbrun’s cavalry was facing the 1st Division. Solignac was visible more to the rear, in front of Pozo Bello, acting as general reserve. The twenty-four guns belonging to these units[426] were all brought to the front, and cannonaded so much of the British line as was visible, doing some little harm. But they were gradually overpowered by the six batteries[427] which Wellington had brought up to his front, and finally ceased to fire. The infantry columns of Marchand and Mermet also suffered appreciably from the shot and shell, for they were well within range, though too far off for infantry fire to tell upon them[428]. It is clear that Masséna refused to attack the front of the 3rd and 1st Divisions till their flank should be turned on the Fuentes side, and since that necessary preliminary was never accomplished, the frontal assault was never delivered,[p. 337] though three divisions stood ready to make it. The only move on this side, during the hours after noon, was that on the extreme left of the French line some voltigeurs, apparently from Mermet’s division, were sent down into the ravine of the Turon, and tried to push up it, as if to turn the right flank of the Guards brigade. They were, however, soon stopped by five companies of the 95th Rifles, whom Craufurd had left to block the passage up this low-lying part of the British position; no serious attempt was made to reinforce the attack, which soon died down into a mere tiraillade.

Masséna’s account of his reasons for refusing to commit himself to the decisive attack runs as follows in his dispatch to the Emperor: ‘The English general had united in his centre very large forces and much artillery. I wished to try to pierce his centre, and to drive the English army towards the lower Coa. The spirit of the troops was admirable; but I had to assure myself, before making this vigorous blow, as to the state of my ammunition, for during the course of this campaign I had seen myself checked repeatedly by insurmountable difficulties. It resulted from the report which the officer commanding the artillery submitted to me, that there only remained in the reserve park four cartridges per man, which might give thirty shots, counting what was still in the men’s cartridge-boxes. I did not think myself in a situation to recommence the attack with such a meagre supply, and decided to send all the empty caissons back to Rodrigo, in order to bring up more ammunition. Meanwhile I took the necessary measures to preserve the advantage already gained over the enemy[429].’

It is clear that we have not here the whole of the Marshal’s motives explained. Granting that the reserve of cartridges had run low, the troops with which he had to deliver the decisive blow were precisely those who had still plenty of ammunition. Mermet’s[430] and Solignac’s divisions had not fired a shot; Marchand’s had only been engaged for a few minutes in Pozo Bello, with the two battalions of the 7th Division which it had evicted[p. 338] from that village. It is true that Ferey’s, Claparéde’s, and Conroux’s troops, which had made the successive attacks on Fuentes, must have been not only exhausted in morale but very short of ammunition by this moment. But why had not the attack by the three intact divisions been made before the troops to their right had been completely used up? Clearly because Masséna refused to deliver the frontal assault till the flanking movement had been successful, and Wellington’s left-centre had been driven from the village. There were several hours about noon during which the troops of Marchand, Mermet, and Solignac remained halted in front of the allied line, while furious fighting was going on in Fuentes. If the Marshal did not let them loose upon the enemy during that long space of time, it was because he thought the attack hopeless. The explanation appears clearly enough in the narrative of his aide-de-camp Pelet: ‘The Marshal came to the front when this sort of defile had become already impregnable; a tiraillade was already established; he threw himself off his horse, and, accompanied only by myself, walked several times up and down the front of the line, to look for a point where he could break in. But the whole position seemed equally strong; the fire of the enemy upon Fuentes, and the reinforcements which he had sent into the village, drew in that direction the bulk of the French divisions. Everything had come to turn upon the affaire de poste in that direction. It was necessary to force the village and the ravine at its back, where all the ground was in favour of the enemy. The day slipped by in vain attacks[431].’

If Masséna did not move his main body at noon, when the British were waging a doubtful contest in Fuentes, it would have been idle to strike after two o’clock, when the attack on the village had utterly failed. The fact was that he had staked everything on the capture of Fuentes, and had seen at an early hour that he dared not send forward Marchand, Mermet, and Solignac, till the village should have been taken and Wellington’s flank turned. But though three divisions had been used up one after another against that strong post, they had failed to master it. The game was up; for to deliver the front attack when the flank attack had failed would have been hopeless.[p. 339] The only chance that the Marshal had of success was to make the two attacks simultaneous: but he had such a respect for Wellington’s main position that he would not assail it till it was turned. It never was turned, and so he never engaged the three divisions that were so long facing it. As a subsidiary reason for his refusal to strike home, we must undoubtedly add the fact that he had discovered that he was too weak in guns to make any proper artillery preparation for an attack on the British centre. In the course of a long duel his twenty-four pieces had been overpowered by the thirty-six which Wellington had placed over against them. They were badly mauled, and largely out of action, by the moment that the fighting in Fuentes village was over. If the infantry had advanced, it would have been shot to pieces by the victorious British artillery, before it could reach the crest of the strong position where the Anglo-Portuguese battalions lay ranged behind the sky-line.
Map of the battle of Fuentes De O?oro, May 5, 1811.

Enlarge  FUENTES de O?ORO.
May 5th 1811.

On the northern flank of the British position, where the 5th Division, about Fort Concepcion, and the 6th Division in front of San Pedro, watched Reynier’s corps across the steep ravine of the Dos Casas, nothing of importance happened throughout the day. The opposing forces were almost equal, each about 10,000 strong, and Reynier had been ordered to make no more than ‘a general demonstration all along his line, to support the attack of the main army.’ It was true that he was also directed to make a parallel movement along the river, if Wellington should draw in towards Fuentes de O?oro the troops immediately opposed to him[432]. But this was never done: Wellington kept the 5th and 6th Divisions almost in their original positions throughout the day. A regiment from the latter (the 53rd)[433] was moved to the edge of the plateau at the north end of Fuentes village, to keep back any attempt to turn the place on that side—but such an attempt was not made, and[p. 340] the rest of the division kept its original place opposite Reynier. The ‘demonstration’ which that general had been ordered to make was duly carried out, but amounted to nothing more than the sending of the 31st Léger and two guns from Heudelet’s division to skirmish, at the edge of the ravine, with the light troops of the 5th Division on the other side[434]. Some more of the French regiments deployed, but never came within gunshot. The figures of the losses on the two sides show how little serious was the engagement: the 31st Léger lost 4 officers and 48 men killed or wounded; the light companies of the British 3/1st, 1/9th, 2/30th, and 2/44th, and of the Portuguese 8th Ca?adores lost 27 men. The 6th Division had no losses at all in its British brigades, and only four men in the 12th Portuguese line. Reynier has been blamed by some French critics for not pushing forward a pronounced attack, but it is hard to see how he could have done more. He was ordered to demonstrate only, not to commit himself to a real action, unless the British should withdraw from his front and go towards Fuentes. And as Wellington kept 10,000 men in his front all day, covered by a difficult ravine, he would only have lost lives, and gained nothing, by engaging. The two divisions opposite him were numerically as strong as himself, and lay in a most formidable position. An attack would have been beaten off, while if he had man?uvred towards Fuentes to join Drouet, the 5th Division could have crossed the ravine and taken him in the rear. Such a movement would also have exposed the convoy intended for Almeida, which lay at Gallegos, to Reynier’s left rear.

Thus ended the battle of Fuentes de O?oro: the fight, which had been hot and well contested down to two o’clock, dying down into a mere skirmishing between outposts before dusk. The total losses of the 5th had been, on the part of the Allies, 1,452 officers and men, of whom 192 were killed, 958 wounded, and 255 taken prisoners. That of the French was 2,192, of whom 267 were killed, 1,878 wounded, and 47 prisoners. On[p. 341] both sides the larger half of the casualties was incurred in the street fighting that raged up and down the village of Fuentes for so many hours; as has been already explained, the Allies lost here 800 men, the French about 1,300. The remaining losses among Wellington’s men are mainly accounted for by the hustling of the 7th Division about Pozo Bello, which cost 237 men, by the cutting up of the light troops of the Guards brigade, where about 100 casualties took place, and by the hard fighting of the cavalry during the early part of the day, while they were covering the retreat of the Light and 7th Divisions, in which they lost 160 men. On the other side the French, besides their casualties in Fuentes village, had 359 officers and men of their cavalry put out of action, and some 400 of Marchand’s and Mermet’s infantry killed or hurt, partly in the storming of Pozo Bello, but mainly in the cannonade in the afternoon, while they were standing in column facing Wellington’s second position, which they were never allowed to attack[435]. Of the 255 prisoners taken from the Allies, nearly 100 were lost about Pozo Bello by the 7th Division, and 94 belonged to the two companies of the 79th captured in Fuentes de O?oro during Ferey’s first attack. Undoubtedly the most surprising item in the statistics of the day is the small loss incurred by the Light Division during its retreat to the British lines, wherein, though beset by 3,000 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, it counted only 67 casualties[436]. But steady infantry, such as the Light Division, was invulnerable even to the most daring horsemen, so long as it preserved its formation in square.

On the morning after the battle, dawn showed the two armies still holding their positions of the preceding night. Masséna had[p. 342] not drawn back, and the line of his pickets was still covering all the ground taken from the British on the 5th. The divisions were encamped close behind, Marchand’s, Mermet’s, and Solignac’s in the edge of the wood on the near side of Pozo Bello, Ferey’s, Conroux’s, and Claparéde’s on the heights facing Fuentes de O?oro, Reynier’s far away to the right. Nor had Wellington moved a man; but from several hours before daylight his troops had been employed in entrenching the new front that they had taken up. This was wellnigh the only occasion during the whole Peninsular War when Wellington used field-fortification on a large scale. A trench with the earth thrown outward was constructed from near Fuentes de O?oro down to the banks of the Turon—a distance of over a mile. There was special protection for the six batteries of artillery distributed down the front, and a great abattis blocking the ravine of the Turon. The village of Villar Formoso on that stream, somewhat to the rear of the line, and that of Freneda, on the extreme right, where the 7th Division lay, had also been put in a state of defence.

Masséna, having failed when the enemy was maintaining a hastily assumed position, had no intention of attacking it when it was entrenched. In his dispatch of the 7th he writes: ‘The enemy has passed the night after the battle in fortifying the crest of the plateau which he occupies. There are five large works, much artillery is visible, and trenches for the firing line. He has put up épaulements in the ravines and behind the rocks; he has barricaded the upper part of Fuentes de O?oro village, and Villaformosa; thus he has called to his aid all the resources of fortifications against an attack that must be made by main force.’ The idea of relieving Almeida had vanished from the Marshal’s mind—as is sufficiently marked by the fact that he ordered the great convoy at Gallegos, which had been collected for throwing into the fortress, to be distributed for the daily necessities of the army, which would otherwise have had to be fed by provisions sent forward from Ciudad Rodrigo. In his report of the battle he states that his intention is now to withdraw the garrison of Almeida, if he can manage it, and to have the place blown up. There is no prospect of dislodging the allied army by a second general engagement; but, by[p. 343] man?uvring, an opportunity of bringing off Brennier and his men may be secured. The primary object of the campaign is therefore abandoned; but the new secondary object of saving the garrison of Almeida may possibly be secured. In this, as we shall see, the Marshal was to succeed, owing to the culpable negligence of some of Wellington’s subordinates. The main purpose of the expedition of the Army of Portugal had been foiled; after the battle the idea of retaining Almeida, as a foothold beyond the frontier, was given up.

Fuentes de O?oro has been called the most hazardous of all Wellington’s fights, and he has often been censured for fighting at all. Success is not always the best criterion of a general’s dispositions, and in this case the fact that Masséna was foiled is not enough to vindicate all his adversary’s arrangements. But when the case against Wellington is stated by critics like Napier, Fririon, or Pelet, it is necessary to set forth his defence, which seems an adequate one. Napier blames his old chief for accepting battle. ‘A mistaken notion of Masséna’s sufferings during the late retreat induced Wellington to undertake two operations at the same time[437], which was above his strength, and this error might have been his ruin, for Bessières, who only brought 1,500 cavalry and six guns to the battle of Fuentes O?oro, might have brought 10,000 men and sixteen guns.’ He erred in sending out Houston’s division to Pozo Bello, and so extending his line to an unwieldy length, across ground which, beyond Fuentes, was suitable for cavalry and lacked defensive strength. By engaging the 7th and Light Divisions on this terrain he gave the enemy ‘great advantages, which Napoleon would have made fatal.’ He took up a position which would have allowed Masséna to detach some of his numerous squadrons round his right flank, by the Sabugal and Sequeiro bridges, to destroy his magazines at Guarda and Celorico, break his communication, and cut up the transport in the rear of the allied army. But, says Napier, ‘with an overwhelming cavalry on suitable ground, the Prince of Essling merely indicated, as it were, the English general’s errors, and stopped short when he should have sprung forward.’

To this it may be answered, firstly, that Wellington would not have fought, if Bessières had brought 10,000 men instead of[p. 344] the two cavalry brigades which actually accompanied him. He states in his dispatch to Lord Liverpool of May 1st that he is prepared to abandon the blockade of Almeida ‘if the enemy have such a superiority of force as to render the result of contest for that point doubtful.’ He also states that he is aware that Masséna might be reinforced by detachments of the troops under Bessières, which would include some of the Imperial Guard. On May 2nd[438] his intelligence through Spanish sources was sufficiently good to enable him to know that very little of the Army of the North had actually moved. If one or both of the Guard infantry divisions had marched for the frontier a week before the campaign began, it is perfectly certain that he must have heard of it, for such a force would have taken long to advance from Valladolid to Ciudad Rodrigo, or still longer from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo. There were secret agents at Salamanca and most of the other towns of the Douro valley, who would certainly have taken care that such a piece of information should reach the hands of Wellington. He fought because he was aware that the force opposed to him practically consisted of the Army of Portugal alone. It will be remembered that, before his short visit to the Alemtejo in April, he gave Sir Brent Spencer elaborate directions as to the position which he was to take up, in case the French should come in overwhelming force to relieve Almeida during his own absence. Spencer was directed to leave the road open, and to draw back to a defensive position covering the allied lines of communication[439]. And this no doubt is the policy which Wellington would have adopted, if Bessières had brought up the infantry of the Imperial Guard to Masséna’s help. Of this the best proof is that he actually followed this plan in September, at the time of the El Bodon fighting, when Dorsenne, Bessières’s successor, came up to the help of the Army of Portugal with a large force.

Napier’s second criticism is of more validity. The placing of the 7th Division at Pozo Bello did extend the front of the army into indefensible ground. But, as has already been pointed out, Wellington’s intention was not to fight with the 7th Division in such a position, if the enemy made a wide flanking movement with a very large force. Houston’s battalions and their cavalry[p. 345] supports were to guard against any attempt to turn Fuentes de O?oro by a mere detachment, operating on a short circle. For this the force sufficed: that, though it was assailed by three infantry divisions and 3,000 cavalry, it came off with a loss of only 400 men, and assumed the new position allotted to it in due course, is surely a testimony to the fundamental soundness of Wellington’s tactics. Flanking detachments must withdraw if hopelessly outnumbered; but that is no reason for saying that such detachments must never be made. Montbrun’s cavalry sought every possible opportunity to act against the 7th and Light Divisions, but had no success save in the one case where they caught two battalions in scattered fragments evacuating a village—even there, owing to the splendid succour afforded by the British cavalry, they did not destroy the unlucky troops, but only cut up 150 of them. The moral is the old one, that cavalry unsupported is helpless against a steady force of all arms, even when it is in movement over open ground. Inferior though the British horsemen were in number, they gave an invaluable support to the infantry, which was never seriously incommoded during its retreat.

But, it is urged[440], the Light and 7th Divisions might have been in great peril if Marchand’s and Mermet’s infantry had followed Montbrun’s cavalry with all speed, and pursued the retiring British, instead of drawing up in front of Wellington’s left centre, to the south of Fuentes village. Masséna seems to contradict the possibility of this in his dispatch, where he says that ‘the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the 6th Corps followed the movement of the cavalry as much as it was possible for infantry in column to do,’ and again: ‘This superb movement [of the cavalry] was stopped; and before our infantry could arrive the enemy had the time to cover the crest of his plateau with several lines of English infantry and a formidable force of artillery[441].’ It seems probable that there was actually not time for Marchand and Mermet, coming out by narrow swampy paths from the woods of Pozo Bello[442], and forced to get into order in[p. 346] the open ere they could move on, to catch up Craufurd and Houston before they were safe in their appointed positions. Moreover, if they had hurried after Montbrun they would have been making a flank march across the front of Wellington’s new line, and exposing themselves to the possibility of a ruinous counter-stroke, like that delivered at Salamanca a year later.

Apparently then, on Masséna’s own showing, the advance of Montbrun was too rapid for the infantry to join him, and if so, the dismal picture drawn by Napier of the cavalry and the Light Division overwhelmed by a combination of Montbrun and Marchand, and hurled in disorder against the 1st Division in its position on the plateau, must be overdrawn. It is rash to criticize Wellington as a tactician, when (as in this case) he was moving troops under his own eye, on ground where calculations of time and pace were simple. If, from his commanding position on the edge of the plateau, he had judged that the French infantry were close enough to Montbrun to give him effective support, he certainly would not have sent out Craufurd to succour Houston, but would have allowed the latter to make the best retreat that he could towards the Turon and Freneda. But Wellington evidently judged that the 7th Division could be brought off without too much risk, and he knew that Craufurd and his veterans could be trusted even in the most delicate situations. No amount of cavalry could harm them, and if the French infantry were far enough away, the operation would be in reality much less hazardous than it looked.

When once the Light and 7th Divisions had got to their appointed places in the new line, it is hard to see that Masséna could have done anything against Wellington’s front, which was well established on a commanding ground, with a steep slope in front, and a superior artillery ranged along the crest. The Marshal himself, as we have seen, after inspecting the new position in person, thought that Fuentes village was the crucial point, and had turned three divisions against it. Undoubtedly, if he could have taken it, the position of the Allies would have been much altered for the worse. But it was a very strong post—as is sufficiently shown by the fact that 4,000 men held it against nearly double numbers for six or seven hours. Indeed, its importance may be compared with that of Hougoumont in the[p. 347] battle of Waterloo—it forced the attacking party to use up a disproportionate number of men against an outwork, whose occupation was absolutely necessary as a preliminary for the general attack which was contemplated. The infantry of the French left could not assail the 1st and 3rd Divisions with any reasonable prospect of success till Fuentes was carried, and, as it was never carried, the attack could not be delivered.

As to Napier’s suggestion that Masséna might have used some of his superabundant cavalry for a raid against the Sequeiro and Sabugal bridges, and the communications of the allied army, it is clear that the move was feasible, but there is no reason to suppose that it would have been effective. The moment that the force—say a couple of brigades—got to the Coa it would have been in the narrow and difficult roads of the mountains—liable to be stopped by the breaking of the first bridge, or the barricading of the road by the first bands of Ordenan?a that it ran against. Cavalry raids to the rear may be effective in the plains, but in a country like northern Portugal they are of very doubtful expediency. The military historian will remember how fruitless in the end were all the brilliant expeditions of J. E. B. Stuart and Morgan in the American Civil War; though they did much damage to trains and convoys, they had practically no effect on the general results of the campaign. Moreover, any expedition to places so remote as Celorico or Guarda would have taken many days, and Masséna had no time to waste; considerations of supply pressed him to make a speedy end to the campaign. On the whole, Napier’s criticism seems unconvincing on this point.

As to Pelet’s and Fririon’s and Delagrave’s carpings at Wellington, they seem to be based on a radical ignorance of the force which he had at his disposal. He may be proved as rash or as timid as the critic pleases, if it is presupposed that he had 50,000 men, as some French writers assert, or horsemen superior in numbers to his enemy, as others have the face to set forth[443]. If the allied army had possessed an adequate cavalry,[p. 348] or two infantry divisions more than it actually contained, we may be sure that the fight would have taken a very different aspect. It was the balance of numbers which forced Wellington to assume a purely defensive position. The critic who urges that Masséna might have left the 2nd and 9th Corps alone in front of the allied position, and have marched with 15,000 men of the 6th and 8th Corps on Castello Bom, taking Freneda on the way, is perhaps the most unreasonable of all—for he would have had the Marshal divide his forces into two groups separated from each other by many miles, with nothing to close the gap. This would surely have led to prompt disaster. It is clear that Wellington could have overwhelmed the containing force, or have crushed the turning force, at his choice. This plan ignores the serious chance of a counter-attack on the part of the British general—a possibility which does indeed seem to have escaped the imaginations of many a French general down to the day of Salamanca. It was deeply rooted in their minds that he was a fighter on the defensive; they had yet to learn that when the chance was given him he could be as formidable on the offensive.