CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF NEWTOWNBUTLER, AND THE RELIEF OF ENNISKILLEN AND DERRY.

The time elapsed since the withdrawal of Galmoy from Enniskillen, on the 24th of March, had not been barren of stirring events; but events of a predatory character, and so differently colored, by the historians of each side, as to leave the mind in a state of uncertainty from the constant succession of almost similar events. This, however, appears distinct enough: that Galmoy, with a small body of troops, continued to check the excursions of the Enniskilleners, and, as the siege of Derry progressed, kept the country open for the passage of the king's trains to and from the metropolis; while, on the other hand, the Enniskilleners, emboldened by his occasional disappearance from their vicinity, renewed their raids under Wolseley, Hamilton, and Blaney, spreading terror wherever they appeared, and supplying their stronghold with the necessary booty of cattle and provender. As their position grew stronger, and their numbers increased, those raids became more frequent and extended, and by the beginning of June were such as to claim immediate and energetic measures for their suppression.

It was therefore resolved that Lord Mountcashel should proceed against Enniskillen from the direction of Dublin, while Berwick and Brigadier Southerland were to approach it from the north and west, and place their commands at his disposal. For this purpose, Berwick was ordered from Derry on the 21st of June. He was to march through Donegal, chastise the outlying insurgents there, and establish his headquarters at Trellick; while Brigadier Southerland, who lay towards Sligo, and under whom Colonel Sarsfield commanded a division of horse, was to move round to Belturbet, and, in his way, scour the country along the south-western side of Lough-Erne. Both were then to drive the enemy within their defences and await the arrival of Mountcashel, who was to proceed from Dublin, through Monaghan and Cavan, when all were to co-operate in a simultaneous movement for the reduction of this rebel stronghold.

On receipt of these orders, Sarsfield, at the head of three troops of horse, one of dragoons, and three battalions of foot,—a force of about five hundred men,—cleared the country along the south-east of the lake, and arrived at Belturbet on the 10th of June. Here he received an order from de Rosen to march forthwith to Omagh, about twenty-five miles north-west of Enniskillen, to protect the Irish besieging army at Derry against rebel attacks from that quarter, and proceeded at once to execute his commission. Southerland, with the remainder of his command—about 1,200 men—advanced through the south of Leitrim, and doubling Lough Oughter, reached the vicinity of Belturbet on the 16th of June. Here he found that Sarsfield had departed for Omagh, and that he was left to cope alone with the united commands of Hamilton, Wolseley, and Lord Blaney. On the 18th, he was informed by one of his spies that the enemy, 15,000 strong, knowing his condition, were about to seize a narrow pass, through which he had advanced, and to attack him in front and rear, with the intention of capturing or annihilating his force before the arrival of Mountcashel.18

On receipt of this information, Southerland, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Scott and two hundred and eighty men in the churchyard of Belturbet to check the pursuit, withdrew in the night, and, by a skilful movement, brought his command in safety to Sligo. The Enniskilleners, baffled in their design, then turned their whole force against Scott, who, after a stubborn contest of two hours, was compelled to surrender: and all the supplies of the garrison, eighty dragoon-horses, seven hundred muskets, and a considerable quantity of gunpowder, fell into the hands of the enemy.

Berwick left Derry on the 21st, and, at the head of his four hundred dragoons, marched rapidly to the town of Donegal, where three hundred of the enemy from Ballyshannon were forming magazines. He approached their position in the night; attacked them at daybreak; killed many, forced the rest to the shelter of the castle; burned the magazines; and marched off with a booty of 1,500 cattle. Being shortly after joined by two regiments of horse and four battalions of foot,19 which swelled his command to 1,200 men, he advanced, and on the 6th of July formed an encampment at Trellick, about nine miles north-east of Enniskillen.

On the 13th, he advanced with a party to reconnoitre the country and the fortifications of the town, when he was ambushed by a force of two hundred foot and one hundred horse, and attacked with great vigor. But notwithstanding the suddenness of the onset, he turned on them; killed all but six of the infantry; drove the horse within their intrenchments, and returned with a captain, a lieutenant, two pair of colors, and the arms of the slain.

Shortly after this he was raised to the rank of lieutenant-general, and the king ordered that he should have troops and artillery to press the object of the expedition. But de Rosen, whose mission to Ireland seems to have been to disconcert every movement that promised success, again ordered him to Derry, and he abandoned the expedition against Enniskillen with that reluctance which he indicated in after years by the following remark: "It is true, we had few, if any, cannonballs, and scarce any ammunition; but yet, as the Fort of Enniskillen was only a mud fort, we might have carried it; besides, the town being entirely unfortified, we should have got possession of it, and by that means have obliged the fort to surrender." But then it was de Rosen's to command, and Berwick's to obey.

The recall of Berwick left the Enniskilleners again free to renew their excursions and strengthen their fortifications, and they availed themselves abundantly of this temporary advantage. Their forces daily augmented, and they grew more exacting on the country as they increased in power. The garrison of Sligo kept them in check on the western side of the lake, but from Ballyshannon round to Belturbet, a circuit of fifteen miles, all had to quit their homes or yield to their exactions. Their military power towards the end of July was formidable; and, taking the forces of Lord Blaney, Captain Francis Hamilton, Wolseley, and Colonel Creighton (the commandant) into account, must have come up to Southerland's estimate of 15,000 men. Stationed at strong positions around the shores of the Lough; having large depots at Ballyshannon, Enniskillen, and Crom Castle, and acquainted with all the intricacies of the lake and its confluents, they should have been able to cope with an army of twice their number. In addition to this, they had lately received from England ten pieces of cannon, with ball and match to suit; fifty barrels of gunpowder; a large supply of dragoon firelocks and muskets; a corps of engineers and gunners; experienced officers, with commissions to raise new regiments of horse and foot; and eight hundred veterans of Kirke's command, under Colonel Berry.

To drive this force from their network of fortifications, and lay siege to Enniskillen, Mountcashel arrived with about 3,600 men and seven pieces of artillery at Belturbet on the 27th of July.

The town had been abandoned, on his approach, and on the 28th he advanced and invested Crom Castle, on the eastern side. By the 30th he had carried the outer works, and driven the enemy within the walls, though not without considerable loss, and at once opened a cannonade upon the castle. While here, he received word that Colonel Berry was advancing on him by way of Lisnaskea, with eight hundred regulars, followed by the united forces of Wolseley and Hamilton. Without discontinuing the operations against the fort, he withdrew a part of his command about two miles to the eastward, and took post at Newtownbutler. Learning that the enemy's forces had all united, and were too powerful to meet in the open country, he sent Colonel Anthony Hamilton, with O'Brien's regiment of dragoons, to hold them in check, while he himself prepared for a retrograde movement to Belturbet. The troops of Hamilton were drawn into an ambush by Berry, near Lisnaskea; their commander was wounded, his next in command killed, and in a retreat which was ordered, two hundred and thirty were slain or taken prisoners. Mountcashel, on hearing of this disaster, advanced with his own regiment of horse; arrested the retreat and repulsed Berry; but seeing Wolseley, with a force of 8,000 men, close in Berry's rear, he took up his retreat to Belturbet. Berry and Wolseley moved forward rapidly; Mountcashel closely pressed, and considering resistance safer than flight, at last drew up his men about a mile to the south of Newtownbutler, and hastily formed in line of battle.

The action which ensued was disastrous to the Irish army. Opposed by more than double their number, and attacked in front and flank, they fought with great bravery, and the battle might have resulted in their favor, but an unfortunate blunder, in carrying out the general's orders, disarranged their lines, created a panic among the soldiers, and a total rout was the consequence. The lake and its tributaries cut them off from escape in any direction, and, being completely hemmed in, they were slaughtered without mercy. Their loss is estimated to be over 2,000 men, of whom 400 only were killed in the battle, the rest being massacred through the night, to the cry of "No popery!" or drowned in the lake into which they had thrown themselves in the vain hope of escaping the general carnage. Mountcashel himself was wounded and taken prisoner, but was saved from death by a captain named Cooper, to whom he had previously rendered a similar service. Sir Stephen Martin and Lord Abercorn, and many officers of distinction, were killed. All that escaped of this unfortunate command fled towards Belturbet, and, after the capture of their general, the expedition was abandoned.

Affairs at Derry were now approaching a crisis. The siege had been pressed with vigor under every disadvantage: minority of force, inadequate artillery, and a season almost unprecedented for heavy rains, which kept the trenches continually filled with water from the beginning to the end of the siege. The besieged, reduced to the last extremity, had become almost passive in their resistance, and were frequently on the point of surrendering, when the appearance of an English fleet would again raise their spirits for a time, but to cause a still greater depression when it had to withdraw without being able to afford relief. Every successive disappointment renewed the murmurs of the people, and cooled the ardor of the soldiers. Several times through the summer they had received fresh supplies of powder and ball; but of provisions, which were as easily smuggled in, they had received little or none.

De Rosen, exasperated by delay, collected the fugitive population of the district, and placing them between the town and his men, gave orders to drive them in on the besieged. The Irish soldiers, though suffering great privations, and eager for the surrender, refused to obey the order, and threatened a mutiny if compelled to enforce it. De Rosen continued unmoved, but Hamilton and the other leaders communicated the circumstance to the king, and received a positive order that the multitude should be allowed to depart unmolested to their homes. The garrison, taking advantage of this circumstance, sent away the most helpless of the citizens, and took in a reinforcement of the young and active in their place, so that de Rosen's cruelty ultimately tended to their advantage.

Yet, notwithstanding the advantage thus gained by the besieged, their suffering had become unendurable, and despair had settled on all, when, towards the middle of July, Kirke again entered Lough Foyle, and displayed his fleet to the wistful eyes of the starving inhabitants, and was again obliged to retire without accomplishing his object. This was the turning-point of the siege. The long-hoped for relief again disappeared; the authorities of Derry determined on a surrender, and demanded a cessation to regulate its provisions. But Kirke managed to convey a note to the governor, concealed in a twisted rope, which he tied round the waist of a country lad, and this note—which may be found in Walker's account of the siege,—apprised him of a plan which he had set on foot to relieve the garrison.

Baffled in his efforts to succor the town from the side of Lough Foyle, Kirke divided his fleet and with one part of it doubled Malin Head, sailed up Lough Swilly, and established a garrison of 800 men near Rathmelton, a few miles west of Derry. The place was well selected for his purpose; which was to attract the attention of the besiegers, and cause them to withdraw some of their forces from the side of the Foyle. This movement was observed by de Rosen, who, instead of drawing his forces from the water-side, ordered Berwick from Enniskillen to check the movements of Kirke, and dislodge him, if possible, without weakening the forces stationed at the obstructions in the river; and Berwick, as already indicated, abandoned Enniskillen, and arrived at Rathmelton, with a force of 1,200 horse, about the 22d of July.

The position occupied by Kirke was one of great natural strength. The inlets of the Lough indented the country in all directions, and extended up to within three or four miles of Derry, presenting almost insuperable difficulties to an attacking force; and, on one of its peninsular mazes, he was found strongly intrenched under the protection of his frigates. Berwick spent a whole day in trying to dislodge him, but without effect, when he retired to an adjacent height, and contented himself with watching his movements, and confining him to his intrenchments.

But Kirke succeeded in his object. Notwithstanding the vigilance of Berwick, he threw both men and munitions into Enniskillen; partially relieved Derry; and conjuring the governor to hold out yet a little longer, sailed out of Lough Swilly, and joined the fleet at the Foyle, while Berwick united his command to the force of the besiegers.

On the 28th of July, the English fleet again appeared in Lough Foyle, and bore up steadily towards the obstructions above Culmore Fort, near the mouth of the river. It consisted of twenty ships of war, 300 transports laden with provisions and military stores, and 6,000 veteran troops under the command of General Kirke.20 The result may be anticipated. The blockading army, not having cannon of sufficient calibre to sink the approaching vessels, the boom across the river was broken. Derry was partially relieved on that day, and, on the 30th, all attempts of the besiegers to thwart their movements had become futile. The whole fleet rode up the river, and succored the beleaguered town, and the Irish army, after a few days more, raised the siege, and retired towards Dublin, on which Marshal Schomberg was reported to be projecting a descent. On their way they were joined by the remnant of Mountcashel's command; nor was the news that preceded them in Dublin of a more cheering character. Since the siege had commenced, the famous battle of Killicrankie had been fought and won. There, on the 26th of May, Dundee, at the head of 2,000 Irish, and about the same number of Highlanders, defeated General Mackay's army of 8,000 veterans. But with this victory expired the hopes of the Jacobite cause in Scotland. Dundee received a mortal wound in the moment of victory; the Highlanders, dispirited by his death, dispersed after a few unimportant skirmishes, and what was left of the Irish contingent returned to their own country.

So ended the siege of Derry, an affair of little military note, but of great political and religious import. Though its gates were closed against the king's troops on the 7th of December, free access to it from the sea was not obstructed until the surrender of Culmore, on the 21st of April. It had made ample preparation for a siege, and, notwithstanding the blockade, had received 480 barrels of gunpowder, and stores of provisions and clothing, from that time until the end of June. It had not been closely invested until the latter part of May; and, unless from the two light field-pieces of General Wauchop, on the water-side, there was no cannonade whatever before the 21st of June, when Berwick withdrew to Enniskillen. The defenders, during the heat of the siege, had other advantages not generally accorded to an enemy. They were allowed to send away ten thousand of the sick and indigent inhabitants, and, during the armistice that ensued, had managed to admit an equal number "of the young and active." They had thirty siege-guns on their walls, 10,000 "regimented men," and a population, stated at twenty thousand, to supply the casualties of war.

The investing force was 5,000 men, four siege-guns, two mortars, and two field-pieces. From this force 400 dragoons marched with the Duke of Berwick to Enniskillen, and during the siege they received but 2,500 additional troops, making the entire force 7,500 men. The weather was continually unfavorable to siege operations, and, excepting in the amount of rations, the besiegers endured far more suffering than the besieged. The bombardment continued at intervals from the 21st of June to the 28th of July; but during the last week there had been an almost entire cessation of hostilities, to admit of negotiations. On the estimate of the Reverend George Walker, who has left a journal of the siege, the ball and mortar, great and small, thrown into the town up to the 22d of July, was 587. After this there was but an occasional shot until the siege was raised. This fell short of fifteen shots a day, and about one every two hours, admitting them to have been fired in regular succession. During the siege the garrison had been reduced to 3,000 effective men, while the besiegers retired with 3,500—showing a loss to the defenders of 7,000, and to the assailants of 3,600.

The Duke of Berwick, who was present in all the skirmishing that took place up to the 21st of June, and who afterwards became a prominent character in the great wars of the continent, had certainly no inducement to magnify this episode in his life, by underrating the Jacobite forces; nor is it to be credited that the Reverend George Walker has given an overestimate of the besieged. Whatever were the privations of the non-combatants,—and they must have been great—it does not appear from his journal that the defenders were, for any considerable time, on an allowance much below that of soldiers in ordinary warfare. We find that in two or three instances they were obliged to resort to the boiling of salt hides for a substitute; and to eating "dogs and cats, etc.," now considered a luxury, though thrown in by Williamite writers to shadow a picture dark enough from any perspective.

But if the defenders did not display as great intrepidity as the besiegers, they showed qualities which, in their position, would be considered by many as more important:—wonderful fortitude and great endurance—and their service to England can scarcely be overestimated. They forced this war for religious ascendency; they maintained this stronghold until the landing of Schomberg, which turned the tide of fortune; but in all that transpired before the walls, the Jacobite army exhibited greater courage, and far greater valor and intrepidity. If, then, it should be asked why they were able to withstand, so long, the greater valor claimed for their enemies, the answer is plain:—Stone walls, abundant means, and great numerical odds. If it be true,—and it is so asserted,—that in a moment of desperation they threw open their gates and invited the enemy to enter, and it should be asked, why they were not accommodated?—it should be remembered that there is a wide difference between rashness and valor. But that they were driven from the open country, by a much inferior force, and twice brought to terms, unwisely rejected by an over-punctilious king, are also as certain as the records of the time are reliable. But, when it is asked, why men and appliances sufficient were not brought to bear on them in time; the answer is harrowing, but nevertheless true:—an impoverished country, a ruined exchequer, and the consequent dependence on the bounty of the French king.