CHAPTER XII

Battle of the Falkland Islands (I)
THE CAREER OF VON SPEE (II)

The Battle of the Falkland Islands was fought on December 8th by a squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir F. Doveton Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., against the German China Squadron—less Emden, but strengthened by the addition of the cruiser Dresden. Admiral Sturdee’s despatch was not published until about three months after the action, but in the meantime several accounts appeared in various newspapers, and since the despatch was published others have been printed in different magazines. Of no other action in the war have we such various or full information as about this. It will perhaps be a convenient way of dealing with this extremely instructive and important engagement to reproduce the Vice-Admiral’s despatch textually, and to supplement it by explanatory notes, and incorporate in these what is most material of the additional information which is available.

The despatch begins with the tabulation of the sections into which the despatch is divided:

A. Preliminary Movements.

B. Action with the Armoured Cruisers.

C. Action with the Light Cruisers.

D. Action with the Enemy’s Transports.

“The squadron, consisting of H.M. ships Invincible, flying my flag, Flag Captain Percy T. H. Beamish;181 Inflexible, Captain Richard F. Phillimore; Carnarvon flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart, Flag Captain Harry L. d’E. Skipwith; Cornwall, Captain Walter M. Ellerton; Kent, Captain John D. Allen; Glasgow, Captain John Luce; Bristol, Captain Basil H. Fanshawe; and Macedonia, Captain Bertram S. Evans—arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10:30 A.M. on Monday, the 7th December, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy’s squadron the next evening, the 8th December.”

The account previously given of the Graf von Spee’s movements leading up to and subsequent to the action off Coronel, will have made the general strategic position in the Eastern Pacific and Southern Atlantic more or less plain. Of his ships, however, this should be added. The clear light and prevalence of smooth water on the China Station has always proved an incentive to good gunnery, and indeed the performances of the Terrible, when Vice-Admiral Sir Percy Scott commanded her as captain, may be regarded as the starting point of all modern gunnery skill. It is not surprising, therefore, that both of Von Spee’s ships should have stood, as they in fact did, at the head of the German Fleet in order of gunnery merit. And it was clear from their performances that their skill was not merely limited to good gun-laying. Both at Coronel and at Falkland Islands they gave conclusive evidence of being perfect masters of such fire control as they possessed, and on the first occasion shot superbly in very rough weather. They therefore constituted an extremely formidable combination. The German 8.2 shell of the latest type—with which these ships were armed—fired a projectile very nearly as heavy as did182 the British 9.2’s—the actual weights are 320 pounds and 380. The percentage is roughly 8.4 to 10. These two ships had as scouts and auxiliaries the Leipzig, Nürnberg, and Dresden, cruisers of similar design; but Dresden was considerably faster than either of her consorts.

After the destruction of the Good Hope and Monmouth, Von Spee cruised for a short time in the Eastern Pacific, and then made his way in leisurely fashion round the Horn with the intention of crossing to South Africa. In a fatal moment he decided to attack the British Colony at Falkland Islands first, and it was this that brought him within reach of Admiral Sturdee’s guns. It is clear enough from his conduct—let alone admissions made by prisoners afterwards—that he had no idea whatever of the strength of the force that had been sent out to attack him. He fully expected to find Canopus at Port Stanley, and he thought it possible that Carnarvon and Glasgow might be there also. And these ships he was quite prepared to engage. It was quite a different thing, however, to take on two battle-cruisers that under any bearing could bring between them a dozen 12-inch guns into action and, on certain bearings, four more. As will be seen from the despatch, the moment he realized the strength against him, he adopted what seemed the only possible course, namely flight.
A. PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS

“At 8 A.M. on Tuesday, the 8th December, a signal was received from the signal station on shore:—

“‘A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards.’

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    “At this time, the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows:—

        “Macedonia: At anchor as look-out ship.

        “Kent (guardship): At anchor in Port William.

        “Invincible and Inflexible: In Port William.

        “Carnarvon: In Port William.

        “Cornwall: In Port William.

        “Glasgow: In Port Stanley.

        “Bristol: In Port Stanley.

“The Kent was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed.

“At 8:20 A.M. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8:45 A.M. the Kent passed down the harbour and took up a station at the entrance.

“The Canopus, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8:47 A.M. that the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8:20 A.M. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles off.

“At 8:50 A.M. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward.

“The Macedonia was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders.”

Here the signal, it will be observed, says “a four-funnel and two-funnel man of war.” The ships were probably end on when they were seen, and in the Nürnberg there was a considerable gap between the after-funnel and the two forward funnels. Seen from a point a little off the direct keel line, she would seem therefore to have two funnels only.

Port William and Port Stanley are two inlets with a tongue of land between them, and opposite this tongue of land is the channel to the sea. Port Stanley is in the184 more southerly division of the harbour, which is also the larger of the two. Canopus was anchored to the eastward of the town of Port Stanley, so that her guns could fire over the low-lying land between her and the sea. The land rises to the north as it creeps round towards the mouth of the harbour, and on this higher land there was an observation station where arrangements had been made by which the fire of Canopus could be directed out to sea at any squadron that threatened to attack. The reader is therefore to imagine the Macedonia lying in the outside mouth of the harbour; Kent anchored in the channel half way between Macedonia and where the harbour divides Port Stanley to the south and Port William to the north; with Inflexible, Invincible, and Carnarvon anchored in line in Port William; the Bristol and Glasgow in the southern bay, with Port Stanley behind them to the westward, and Canopus behind them to the east.

The Vice-Admiral wasted no time. As a fact, all his ships were then coaling. And the officers not engaged in this were making plans for a day’s shooting over the rough moors in the neighbourhood of the town—where hares and partridges were to be found—and were many of them in mufti, and most of them at breakfast when the startling and welcome news of the advent of the enemy came to them. Everything, of course, gave way to the necessity of getting out of harbour with the utmost speed. Colliers were cast off. The furnaces were fed, and all hands were started to clean first the ships and then themselves. At eight the first ships seemed to be probably twenty miles off. Twenty minutes later, a further detachment came into sight; half an hour later than that, the last of the Germans were seen upon the horizon.

Round about 9 o’clock Kent was outside the harbour,185 while Gneisenau and Nürnberg were approaching at about twenty knots.

3. “At 9:20 A.M. the two leading ships of the enemy (Gneisenau and Nürnberg), with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the Canopus, who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the Invincible at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

“A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the Kent at the entrance to the harbour, but about this time it seems that the Invincible and Inflexible were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

“The Glasgow weighed and proceeded at 9:40 A.M. with orders to join the Kent and observe the enemy’s movements.”

The Germans, as we have seen, expected possibly to find Canopus at the Falkland Islands, but not that she would be concealed from their fire behind the low-lying ground. Their astonishment then to find themselves under the fire of 12-inch guns at twenty minutes past nine was considerable. They therefore turned, not with the intention of running away but clearly to throw out the fire control that was directing the big guns at them, for it must have been about this time that they saw the county cruiser Kent in the offing, and their first thought was to go in and finish her off. But a very few moments after there opened up over the line of vision the tripod masts of the two battle-cruisers, and the Gneisenau and Nürnberg, that had been coming due north for the attack,186 now turned round to the east, and went full speed to join their approaching consorts, who were cutting off the corner made by the first two ships.

Two quite important questions arise at this point. Was it good policy on the part of Admiral Sturdee to allow Canopus to open fire and so drive the Germans away? If, indeed, it was Canopus that drove them off. He knew, of course, that it would take him at least half an hour to forty minutes before all his squadron could be clear of the harbour, and ready to begin the chase. Would it have been wiser if he had allowed the Germans to come right up and so to have made sure of having them within easy range when he did come out? The answer to this criticism is obvious. Gneisenau was a great deal more than a match for Kent, and no British ship could have got out to her assistance in time to prevent her destruction if Gneisenau had been allowed to close. The speed of Admiral Sturdee’s battle-cruisers was such—he had certainly a five, if not a six knot advantage over the armoured cruisers—that he knew he had it well within his power with the whole day before him, to give the Germans forty minutes’ start, and catch them and finish them off before evening. And it was his business to do this, if he could, with the smallest possible loss of life and the least possible damage to his ships. That is the first point. But next, it was quite within the possibilities of the case that Canopus’s guns would make a hit either on Gneisenau or Nürnberg. Indeed, so close did the fourth and fifth rounds go that it was thought on shore that there had been a hit; but this was afterwards proved to be a mistake. There was a good chance then of laming one of them and so making a quick capture certain. Finally, it was not altogether the fire of Canopus but the sight of the battle-187cruisers’ masts that decided Von Spee, or rather the Captain of Gneisenau, to retreat.

It is more pertinent to ask whether it would not have been better policy on the part of the Germans to have got inside the range of Canopus—for obviously if she had fired over the hills she would not be able to use her guns at short range—and then bring the British squadron under an accurate bombardment just when they were coming out of harbour and unable to use their armament to effect. The same considerations that weighed with Admiral Sturdee in deciding to allow Canopus to open fire with the possible result of driving them off, should have weighed with the German captain and made him realize that once the battle-cruisers were out of harbour, there was no possible escape either for his ship or for the flagship. And it is undoubtedly certain that whether they could have succeeded in sinking and destroying any British ships before being destroyed themselves, they must have done vastly greater damage than they were, in fact, able to inflict in an action which, as we shall see, the British Admiral was able to fight on his own conditions from first to last. The main features of the final issue—that is, the destruction of the two armoured cruisers—could certainly not have been prevented, but had they closed the range, and fought the British ships as they came out, the complete escape of the light cruisers could have been assured, and it is certain that they could have done very great damage before being destroyed themselves.

4. “At 9:45 A.M. the squadron—less the Bristol—weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order: Carnarvon, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the southeast, hull188 down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the northwest.”

At 9:45, when the squadron got clear of the harbour and was working up to full speed, the Germans, whose main squadron was about 8? sea miles off at 9:30, while Gneisenau and Nürnberg were three miles closer in, were probably about twelve or thirteen miles off. There was then a gap of five or six miles to be made up before action range could be reached, and to make this good in three hours the British squadron would have to produce a speed greater by some two knots.

“At 10:20 A.M. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle-cruisers quickly passed ahead of the Carnarvon and overtook the Kent. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two miles from the Invincible, and the Inflexible was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to twenty knots at 11:15 A.M. to enable the other cruisers to get into station. At this time the enemy’s funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.”

It will be observed that the British Admiral was carrying on his chase on a wide front and at full speed—probably twenty-four knots. Only Glasgow, Kent, and the two battle-cruisers could maintain this, which meant that Carnarvon and Cornwall were falling very much behind. The Admiral therefore, after an hour, dropped his speed to twenty knots to enable his two cruisers to catch up. Why did he do this?

In the first place, his burst at full speed had probably shown him that instead of having an advantage of only two knots in speed over his enemy, he could beat him by at least five knots when he chose. And he reasoned that if he drove at the five German ships with only four of his189 own, it was possible for the German ships to scatter and so for one or more of them to escape. It was of the essence of his tactics that the enemy should keep his fleet together as long as possible, and it was a vital matter that when the dispersion took place the pursuit of the light cruisers should be undertaken by his own light cruisers with the best possible prospects of bringing all of them to action. As we shall see by the next paragraph, this measure did not attain its desired end.

“The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided at 12:20 P.M. to attack with the two battle-cruisers and the Glasgow.

“At 12:47 P.M. the signal to ‘Open fire and engage the enemy’ was made.

“The Inflexible opened fire at 12:55 P.M. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the Invincible opened fire at the same ship.

“The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1:20 she (the Leipzig) turned away, with the Nürnberg and Dresden, to the southwest. These light cruisers were at once followed by the Kent, Glasgow, and Cornwall, in accordance with my instructions.

“The action finally developed into three separate encounters besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.”

It is plain from this that when the speed was limited by that of its slowest ship, that is, the Carnarvon, the squadron was unable to gain on the Germans at all. The time, therefore, had come to force the enemy to a decision, and full speed was once more ordered. The British squadron190 from now until the next decisive move was taken, must be pictured in this way—the two battle-cruisers and Glasgow racing along at twenty-six or twenty-seven knots; Cornwall and Kent following along at their best speed—probably a knot and a half or two knots less—and Carnarvon bringing up the rear. She must soon have been left considerably behind. For an hour then the two squadrons had probably been keeping about twenty-one knots at a distance of about 19,000 yards. Half an hour’s chase at twenty-five knots brought the range to 17,000 and twenty-five minutes later, to something less than 15,000.

The German squadron was now under fire and Von Spee made the signal, “I intend to fight the battle-cruisers as long as I can, the light cruisers are to scatter and to escape if possible.” The reader will of course realize that up to this moment Leipzig, Nürnberg, and Dresden had been limiting their speed by the speed of Scharnhorst. This was undoubtedly Von Spee’s second mistake, if we assume he was wrong in not attacking the British squadron as it issued from the harbour. By keeping his light cruisers with him until the British were within ten miles of him, he brought their chance of escape to a very low ebb indeed. It is clear that Admiral Sturdee’s drop in speed at 11:20 completely deceived him. He probably thought that none of the British cruisers could exceed the speed the Vice-Admiral then ordered.

We now have to treat of the rest of the day’s work as three separate actions, though it is really more correct to call it four, because the actions between Kent and Nürnberg, Cornwall and Glasgow with Leipzig had, after the first phase, no influence one upon the other. We will deal first, as the Vice-Admiral does, with the action with the armoured cruisers.