CHAPTER XV

Battle of the Falkland Islands (IV)
STRATEGY—TACTICS—GUNNERY

Von Spee’s mistakes we have seen in the course of my comment on the narrative. They were broadly fourfold. Three arose from an inability to realize from the very beginning the true character of the situation, the fourth from want of resolution to fight an unequal action on the only conditions in which any success was to be gained.

Von Spee’s initial blunder was approaching the Falkland Islands with the whole of his force instead of making a reconnaissance by a single fast, light cruiser. It was obvious that he could gain nothing by surprise. For it was beyond the power of the colony to extemporize defence. It was equally obvious that he stood to lose everything if he was himself surprised. And however improbable it might have seemed to him that a force superior to his had reached the Falkland Islands by this date, he should yet have realized that there was nothing impossible in such a force being there very much earlier. For from the North Sea to the Falkland Islands is only a little over 7,000 miles. He might have credited the British Admiralty with a willingness to avenge Cradock’s defeat and with ingenuity enough to arrange the most secret coaling of any force that was sent out. When all allowances were made, there should have been no difficulty in battle-cruisers reaching the South Atlantic three214 weeks after they were despatched. Nor was there any reason why the despatch should be delayed more than two weeks after the news of the disaster.

If Gneisenau, instead of turning away when the tripod masts of the battle-cruisers were seen, had persisted in the advance towards Kent; had Scharnhorst joined her at top speed, it is morally certain that Kent and Macedonia would have been destroyed before either of the battle-cruisers could come to their rescue. It would not have been difficult to have found dead ground that the guns of Canopus could not reach, and from such a point to have subjected the battle-cruisers to a most damaging succession of salvoes, as they emerged from the narrow channel, before there was any possibility of their replying. It was indeed possible that the motive power of each might have been so injured that a pursuit by the battle-cruisers would have been impossible. At the worst, Von Spee would have paid no higher price than he ultimately paid, and he might have won an exchange entirely beneficial to German arms. Certainly, an action fought in these conditions would have given ample time for the light cruisers to make their way into the winding and uncharted fjords of Patagonia. Here Dresden maintained herself for many weeks, and who knows but that the others might have lasted longer still? Had it been possible for the three to keep together they would have been formidable opponents for any single cruiser in search of them. Had they scattered and been able to maintain their coal supply, they could have held up British trade for a considerable time.

Just as Von Spee missed this real opportunity, so, later on, he first of all kept his light cruisers with him far too long, and then, throughout the action, accepted battle215 far too much on Admiral Sturdee’s conditions. But the initial mistake was the greatest.
BRITISH STRATEGY

The battle of the Falkland Islands was an event of enormous importance and interest, and I propose to discuss a few of its more obvious bearings. Let us first consider its immediate direct and indirect effects upon the course of the war. The overseas naval situation at the end of October, while not in the larger sense at all threatening or dangerous, afforded nevertheless grounds for very great anxiety. Emden had made a series of sensational captures in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. Karlsruhe was working havoc with the British trade off the northeast corner of South America. The German China squadron had evaded the Japanese and British and Allied fleets in the East, and Australia and her consorts had obtained no news of its whereabouts when cruising between the Antipodes and the German islands. A few British ships had been taken by Dresden on her passage down to the Straits of Magellan, and the public was entirely without information which led them to suppose that either Von Spee or any of the raiding cruisers were the subject of any effective pursuit. Though the loss of ships by hostile cruisers was absurdly smaller than experts had anticipated, it was quite large enough to disconcert and alarm the public, who knew, after all, very little about the character of those anticipations. Suddenly in the first week of November came two thunderclaps. Admiral Cradock, with a preposterously weak force, had been engaged and been defeated by the lost Von Spee. Of the four ships composing his squadron, the armed liner Otranto and the light cruiser Glasgow had216 escaped, but Good Hope and Monmouth had gone down, lost with all hands. Then on November 3rd came the bombardment of Lowestoft by certain German cruisers. It was the first attack of any kind on the people of these islands, and it was hastily explained to us by the Admiralty—and quite rightly—that the thing was without a military objective or military importance, and as if to forestall naval criticism, we were further told that it would not be allowed to disturb any previously made Admiralty plans. We were asked to believe that it was a mere piece of frightfulness.

But it is not certain that this was the only motive of the adventure. May it not have been done in the express hope that the British higher command, face to face with a shocked and outraged public opinion, would hesitate about diminishing those forces at home which were best calculated to intercept and bring to action the fast vessels which alone could be employed with any chance of safety on these bombarding expeditions? Is it not more than possible that the German staff, knowing the prospects of the rebellion in South Africa, was most desperately anxious to give Von Spee an added chance of crossing the Atlantic in security and lending the tremendous support of his squadron to the German forces in South-West Africa, who, with this added prestige, could be counted upon to attract all the disaffected South African sentiment to its side? Were not these bombardments, in short, undertaken solely to compel us to keep our stronger units concentrated?

Whether this was the German plan or not, let it stand to the credit of the Fisher-Churchill régime that no fear, either of public opinion or as to the success of future raids, stood in the way of dealing promptly with the Von217 Spee menace. It should undoubtedly have been dealt with long before. It was a blunder that Jerram’s force was not overwhelmingly superior to Von Spee’s; a blunder that he had not been instructed to shadow him from the beginning. Cradock’s mission ought never to have been permitted. But now that fate had exposed these errors of policy, the right thing at last was done. Yet it must have taken some nerve to do it. The British forces in the North Sea had certainly been greatly strengthened since the outbreak of war. Agincourt, Erin, Canada, Benbow, and certain lighter units had joined the Grand Fleet. Tiger was finished and commissioned as part of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet under Sir David Beatty. This gave him four battle-cruisers of a speed of twenty-eight knots and armed with 13.5 guns, in addition to the four of an older type—New Zealand, Indomitable, Invincible, Inflexible. To take two of these and send them after Von Spee reduced this force very considerably, but it was probably thought that the addition of Tiger left Sir David strong enough for the main purpose. After victory had been won a month later, rumours were prevalent that a third battle-cruiser had been despatched westward as well, but this has never been confirmed. But on the main point, namely, the vital importance of sending an adequate force for the pursuit and capture of Von Spee, the strategical decision was indisputably right.

Its value can be judged by the immediate results of the victory. Between November 1st and December 8th it is almost true to say that British trade with the west coast of South America was at a standstill. On the east coast things were very little better. For if shippers were still willing to send their ships to sea, it was only on the receipt of greatly enhanced freights. Immediately218 after the victory Valparaiso shipping put to sea as if no war was in existence, and all Pacific and South Atlantic freight fell immediately to normal. Even the escape of Dresden did not qualify the universal sense of relief. The repercussion in South Africa was equally prompt. The rebellion in the Anglo-Dutch colonies had been put down. But to embark on the conquest of German South-West Africa was a different thing altogether, and certainly one that could not be attempted so long as there was the least suspicion of insecurity in General Botha’s sea communications. And while Von Spee was at large this insecurity was obvious. One of the direct results then of the despatch of Admiral Sturdee to the South Atlantic was to make the first military invasion of German territory both possible and ultimately successful.

Apart from its immediate results in the way of relieving British trade in South America and removing the last obstacle to active British military policy in South Africa, the Falkland Islands engagement was of enormous value not only in re-asserting the prestige of the British Navy, but in giving fresh heart to all the Allies after the exhausting struggles to defeat the German advances on the French capital and Calais. It was especially the first definite proof the Alliance had received that British sea-power was no vague and shadowy thing, but a real force which, rightly and relentlessly employed, must ensure the ultimate victory of Allied arms. These were its good sides.

It had one lamentable and disastrous consequence. Emden was captured before the battle-cruisers left their English port. Karlsruhe was never heard of again, and the rumours of her destruction seemed before December to be well founded, so that after the victory of December 8th, beyond the fugitive Dresden and two armed liners219 unaccounted for, there was not a German ship in the world to threaten a single British trade or territorial interest. For Koenigsberg, if she had escaped the guns of the two ships that had attempted her destruction in the mouth of the Rufigi, which was doubtful, was at any rate so closely blockaded that her power for active mischief was clearly at an end. German naval force was then limited to the High Seas Fleet, still of course intact, but with apparently no wish to attempt an active, and no power to make an effective, offensive. Of this force Sir John Jellicoe seemed to have taken the measure. Four months of activity, strenuous and anxious beyond description, had made our fleet bases proof against submarine attack, so that the only offensive open to the German fleet, that embodied in the policy of attrition, was no longer a menace. The submarine attack on trade was unexpected. At a blow, then, Whitehall, which for four months had been kept on tenterhooks by its unpreparedness for cruiser or submarine warfare, suddenly found itself without a naval care in the world.

But Mr. Churchill could not be idle, and the tempter planted in his fertile brain the crazy conception that the unemployed and unemployable fleet should add to his laurels, by repeating, on the Dardanelles forts the performances of the German howitzers at Liège, Maubeuge, and Antwerp. The failure of the Naval Brigade at Antwerp was to be picturesquely avenged. In judging of the results of the Falkland Islands battle then, we must set against its immediate and resounding benefits the humiliating tragedy of Gallipoli.
THE TACTICS OF THE BATTLE

The battle of the Falkland Islands, as we have seen, resolved itself into three separate engagements, and two220 of these may be taken as classic examples of the tactics of superior speed and armament, unconfused by the long-distance torpedo. It was this theory of tactics that held the field in England from 1904 or 1905, when the Dreadnought policy was definitely adopted, until 1912 or 1913 when the effect in naval action of the new torpedo, was first exhaustively analyzed. These actions, then, taken in conjunction with the Sydney-Emden fight, stand entirely by themselves, and it is possible that very little naval fighting will ever take place again under similar conditions.

At the Dogger Bank and off the Jutland Reef the torpedo was employed to the fullest extent, with results that we shall see when we come to consider these actions. We have of course, no direct statement that no torpedoes were employed in the Falkland engagements. Indeed in a modified way the torpedoes certainly had some influence. But there is the whole world of difference between torpedoes fired singly from one warship to another, and torpedoes used both in great quantities and by light craft which, under the defensive properties of their speed, can close to ranges sufficiently short to give the torpedo a reasonable chance of hitting, or, by taking station ahead, can add the target’s to the torpedo’s speed to increase its range. We shall be broadly right then in treating these engagements as affairs of gunnery purely, for the torpedo had seemingly no influence in the periods that were decisive.

Briefly put, what were the tactics of Admiral Sturdee with the battle-cruisers, and Captain Ellerton with Cornwall and Glasgow on December 8th? Their business was to destroy an enemy far weaker than themselves, one who had neither strength enough to fight victoriously nor speed enough to fly successfully. Both followed the same plan.221 They employed their superior speed, first to get near enough for their heavier guns to be used with some effect, and then, whenever the enemy tried to close, to get to a range at which his inferior pieces could be expected to get a considerable percentage of hits, they man?uvred to increase the range so as to keep the enemy at a permanent gunnery disadvantage. As this long-range fire gradually told, the enemy’s artillery became necessarily less and less effective, until he was reduced to a condition in which he could be closed and finished off without taking any risks at all. These tactics resulted in Gneisenau and Scharnhorst being destroyed by Invincible and Inflexible, the whole crews of both German ships being either killed or captured, while the two battle-cruisers had three casualties only. Invincible was actually hit by twenty-two shells, Inflexible by only three, and it was the latter ship who had the only three men hit. Cornwall received eighteen direct hits and, like Invincible, had no casualties at all, while Glasgow had one man killed and five wounded.

Obviously an action could not be fought upon these lines unless time and space sufficed in which to bring about the desired result. In point of fact, when the disparity of force is considered, the time taken was extraordinary. Inflexible opened fire on the German cruisers at five minutes to one, Scharnhorst sank at seventeen minutes past four, and Gneisenau just after 6 o’clock. If we suppose only twelve 12-inch guns to have been bearing throughout the action, we have one hundred 12-inch gun hours! There was time therefore—at a battle-practice rate of fire—for both ships to have fired away their entire stocks of ammunition at least dozens of times over. What they did, of course, was to fire extremely deliberately when the target was within range and the conditions suitable,222 and to cease fire altogether when they were man?uvring.

In the Cornwall-Glasgow-Leipzig action, fire was opened at about 4 o’clock, and it was not till about 7:8 that the enemy was beaten. An hour afterwards he sent up signals of distress and surrendered. Here there were eleven 6-inch guns in the two British broadsides, and five 4-inch, against a handful of 4.25. The disparity in force was perhaps not quite so great as in the battle-cruiser action, but these things are difficult to compare, and from all accounts 6-inch lyddite, once the hitting begins, does not take long to put a light cruiser of the Leipzig class completely out of action.

Captain Allen’s action against Nürnberg is in very sharp contrast to this. He opened fire at 5 o’clock, some few minutes after the enemy had attacked him. The range was about 11,000 yards, and for some time no apparent damage was done. At 5:45, however, though Nürnberg seemed still undamaged, the range was reduced by 4,000 yards, owing to Nürnberg’s sudden loss of speed. There then followed twenty minutes of action at ranges between 6,000 and 3,000, and these sufficed to finish the enemy off altogether. It may be objected to Captain Allen’s tactics that he received twice as many hits as the Cornwall and had twelve men wounded and four killed. But as Admiral Sturdee points out in his despatch these casualties were almost entirely caused by a single chance shell that burst in a gun position, right amongst the crew. No one in any of the very exposed positions—control tops, rangefinder positions, etc.—was even touched. Too much, therefore, must not be made of the casualties, for in this matter chance enters too largely for safe deductions to be made. Invincible, for instance, received twenty-two hits223 without a single casualty, Inflexible three hits and three casualties. Cornwall and Kent were sister ships, and if the gun shields of Kent were unable to protect one crew, any one of the eighteen shells that hit Cornwall might have done equal damage to that suffered by Kent. The value, as it seems to me, of the Kent-Nürnberg example lies in this, that for all practical purposes exactly the same result was obtained, at the same cost, in one hour—of which twenty minutes was at almost point-blank range—in this action, as was got by two ships in three hours in the Leipzig action, and by two battle-cruisers in five hours in the battle cruiser action.

It would be a mistake to assume that we see a new contrast in methods in these engagements. Kent certainly followed the Nelsonian tradition. He closed with his enemy at top speed, and got not only the full artillery value of his attack, by making hitting easier and therefore more certain, but won what is hardly less valuable, the vast moral advantage of giving his enemy no breathing time at all. There are fifty parallels to this, of which Trafalgar is in fact only the supreme example. Given a superior force of guns—obtained by Nelson by the concentration of the whole of his fleet on the centre and rear of the enemy—the tactical plan is to be found in the method of bringing these guns to do their work in the shortest possible time.

We can find many exact parallels to Admiral Sturdee’s tactics in the war of 1812, for the Americans employed them against us with the utmost success on several occasions. Indeed, it was these victories that led first to a practical revival of gunnery skill—brought about with such effect by Broke—and later to Sir Howard Douglas’s effort to create a scientific study of gunnery in the British Navy. It is now nearly a hundred years since his historic224 work on naval gunnery was published. His father had been one of Howe’s captains and had invented an important improvement in naval guns. The son entered the Artillery, and his education, no less than his family tradition, made him both an interested observer and a very competent critic of the naval gunnery of the period. He had, in his own words, witnessed “the triumphant and undisputed domination of the British marine,” after the victories of Nelson had swept continental fleets from the sea, and then, seven years after Trafalgar, he had seen this triumphant navy utterly humiliated by the Americans in the war of 1812. He analyzed the causes both of the triumph and the humiliation, and was, perhaps, the first to lay down the most important of all maxims of naval doctrine—then and still also the most neglected.

He pointed out how, in the later years of the Republic, practical gunnery amongst French seamen was so wretched that strongly manned ships were seen “employing batteries of twenty or thirty guns against our vessels without more effect than might easily have been produced by one or two well-directed pieces. Indeed in some cases, heavy frigates used powerful batteries against our vessels for a considerable time without producing any effect at all.” Thus, the victories of the Nelsonian era were made possible because of the great disparity between the two forces in gunnery skill, and it was this disparity that made it possible to adopt the tactics by which the victors got their great successes. Victory was won by superior skill and tactics founded upon its employment. And in the hour of victory we forgot its conditioning cause.

“We became,” says Douglas, “too confident by being feebly opposed, and then slack in warlike exercises, by not225 being opposed at all. And, lastly, in many cases inexpert for want of even drill practice. And herein consisted the great disadvantage in which, without suspecting it, we entered, with too great confidence, into a war with a marine much more expert than that of any of our European enemies. Comparative views of warlike skill, as well as of bulk and force ... are necessary to correct analysis of naval actions.”

In the course of his work he made a very detailed analysis of the actions between the Macedonian and the United States, the Guerriere and the Constitution, the Shannon and the Chesapeake, and the Java and the Constitution. In the three instances in which the Americans were victorious, they owed success to no superiority in the handling of their ships, but to a combination of longer-range guns and a much higher accomplishment in marksmanship and tactics designed to keep outside the range of British effective fire. In none of the three cases could any criticism be based upon the bravery of any of the British officers and crews. All were, in fact, honourably acquitted by court martial. But it was obvious in each case that had the gunnery skill been equal, while the difference in armament might ultimately have been decisive, the enemy would have had to pay very dearly indeed for victory. In each case, in point of fact, the victor’s losses were trivial. Amongst these, the action between Shannon and Chesapeake stands out just as the Kent and Nürnberg action stands out in the Falkland Islands. Broke, in the first very few minutes of the engagement, established a complete fire ascendancy over Chesapeake, and had he chosen, could have hauled off and pounded her into submission without risking the life of a single one of his men. But, as in the first instance, he had relied upon close action,226 trusting with perfect confidence to the skill and marksmanship of his well-trained crew, so after he had got Chesapeake out of control, he chose the quickest path to victory. He ran straight alongside and boarded her without a moment’s delay. As at Trafalgar, so here we see the British commander pre-occupied with one thought only—to bring the enemy to action as soon as possible and to finish the business quickly and decisively. So long as this is ensured, there is no thought of losses nor any hesitation in risking the ship.

Why was there any other tactical conception? It arose, as we have just seen, in the war of 1812 and was spontaneously reproduced in 1905, and in both cases it was the product of a new skill in long-range gunnery. In 1812 there was the choice in armament, long range and short range that existed in 1905, but with this striking difference. The long-range gun of a century ago might be an eighteen or twenty-four pounder, but it was far heavier for the weight of shell it used than the short-range carronade. There was therefore a distinct temptation to arm ships with a lighter gun that would be more effective at close range, and the mistake was not discovered till the greater skill of the American ships made it clear that the long gun, in a ship rightly handled, could prevent the short-range gun from coming into action at all. But in our own day the pride of length of reach goes with the heavier projectile. Not that the 12-inch guns of Inflexible and Invincible literally outranged the 8.2’s of Von Spee, for the Germans have always mounted their guns, as we have seen, so that they can be elevated far more greatly than our own. It is quite possible therefore, that, speaking literally, Von Spee’s 8.2’s, as they were mounted, might have outranged Sir Doveton Sturdee’s 12-inch. But at227 the extreme range of the 12-inch, it would be almost impossible for the 8.2’s to hit on account of the extremely steep angle at which the shot falls, and, consequently, the high accuracy in range knowledge required and the improbability of the gun shooting with perfect precision at such extreme distances. But both in 1812 and now, the basic idea behind seeking for a long-range decision is defensive. Captain Glossop opened up the range when Emden closed him and got the advantage of his heavy artillery. Admiral Sturdee kept the range as long as possible to save his ships from being hit. Captain Ellerton did his best to keep Cornwall and Glasgow out of Leipzig’s reach. In all these cases there was a very obvious argument in favour of defensive tactics. Sydney, Glasgow and Cornwall, Inflexible and Invincible were all at very great distances from dockyards and possibilities of repairs. The two battle-cruisers were a considerable percentage of our total Dreadnought force. It was not a question of risking their destruction; it might at any moment be vital for them to be immediately ready for action. If possible, even the shortest period devoted to repairs and docking should be avoided. These considerations do not excuse defensive tactics; they may be said to have imposed them. But this should not blind us to the fact that they were defensive.

And this leads to another interesting question. Von Müller in Emden began the action by trying to close Sydney. Von Spee turned at right angles at one o’clock to shorten the range. Nürnberg finally turned round to bring her broadside to bear on Kent, but she was too late. Leipzig never turned at all. In no case did the German commanders persist in seeking a short-range action. Cradock apparently did nothing to close Von Spee at228 Coronel. What would have happened if Von Spee and Von Müller had stuck to their resolution to close? In all these cases, as we have seen, the weaker side accepted the stranger’s conditions. But it was not necessary that it should have been so. A resolute effort to close at full speed would no doubt throw a broadside of guns out of action, just as flight did. But would the stronger ships have run away had the weaker persisted in attacking? If they had held their course, there would have been a very considerable change of range, in itself a defensive element favouring the weaker ship. We can take it for granted that no effort to close would ultimately have saved the weaker ship in any case. But—and this seems to me to be the vital point—would not his chance of seriously damaging the stronger have been far higher? And is not this the one thing that should preoccupy the weaker force when compelled to engage?

Finally, two entirely new elements in naval fighting in our own time distinguish it from the fighting of the early days of last century. With ships dependent upon wind, if the chance of engaging was lost, it might never recur.

In all Nelson’s letters, memoranda, and sayings, he is haunted by the vital importance of swift decision and rapid and resolute action. The whole spirit behind the Trafalgar Memorandum is impatience of delay. When the Allied Fleet was seen, there was no time wasted in securing symmetrical formations or order. The Fleet was roughly grouped as Nelson intended it should be, and the only preliminary of action was not a race to get into station but a race to get to grips with the enemy. The cult of the close action was thus a direct outcome of the haunting uncertainty as to whether the fighting ship229 would be able to move or not. This has all been changed by steam. Admiral Sturdee, for instance, at 10:20, 11:15, and 12:20 knew perfectly well that he could have the Germans in his grip and finish the thing off in five minutes whenever he liked. If he played with them as a cat plays with a mouse, it was because he knew that he had time on his side. But time will not always be on the side of what is for the moment the stronger force. The enemy may be heading for protection or may be expecting reinforcements, or the light may suddenly fail altogether. In spite of steam, therefore, the desirability of a quick decision is really as paramount in modern conditions as in the old days. So that, had the problem of action never been complicated by the long-range torpedo, we ought, as soon as we began the cultivation of long-range gunnery, to have realized that it was useless to limit our skill to conditions in which the target ship and the firing ship were keeping steady courses.

A further argument against closing the range in modern conditions has been put forward. Just as the change from sails to steam has helped the tactician of to-day, so the altered relation of the destructive power of the weapon and the resisting power of the ship has operated to his disadvantage. Lion, for instance, in the Dogger Bank affair, was knocked out by a chance shot that killed no men and did no vital injury to the ship at all. But it cut the feed pipes of an engine, and in two minutes the ship was disabled and for the purposes of that action, useless. Only small damage could be done to sailing ships by a shot amongst the masts and rigging. And when to a single shot there is added the risk of a torpedo, it must be admitted that the arguments against closing are stronger to-day than they were.

230
A POINT IN NAVAL ETHICS

The conduct of Cradock and his captains at Coronel, of Von Müller in Emden, and of the captains of Gneisenau, Leipzig, and Nürnberg, raises an interesting point in the ethics of war. Captain Glossop, it will be remembered, after driving Emden on to the rocks at Direction Island, had to return towards Keeling Island to look for the Emden’s tender. When he came back with certain prisoners on board, he appealed to Von Müller to surrender. No reply was given, and the prisoners on board the Sydney informed Captain Glossop that no surrender would be made. It therefore became necessary to open fire again. This brought about the hauling down of the German flag. Gneisenau had lost 600 killed out of a crew of eight or nine hundred when, at 8:40, she hauled down her flag. Leipzig and Nürnberg were in a similar case. Bluecher was similarly defeated long before she was sunk. Both Good Hope and Monmouth were apparently out of action within five minutes of action beginning. Now in each instance it is obvious that fighting was carried on, and that therefore men were sacrificed, long after the ship was hopelessly beaten. But in many cases not only was the fighting carried on, so to speak, gratuitously, but the ship herself scuttled, thus ensuring the drowning of several wounded men and risking the drowning of a very large number of unwounded. In all, taking the Emden, Gneisenau, Nürnberg, Leipzig, and Bluecher together, it is not improbable that over 1,000 lives were thus thrown away to no immediately military purpose. The alternative was to surrender the ship. Why is it taken for granted that no ship, however fairly defeated in action, however hopeless further resistance, may not quite honourably yield herself a prize to the enemy?231 It is an entirely new doctrine, unknown in an age surely not inferior in naval skill, in military spirit, or in chivalrous feeling. Does it date from the howl of execration that went up in Russia when, after the flower of the Russian fleet had been defeated at Tsushima, Nebogatoff surrendered his archaic craft to the overwhelming force of the victors?

So far as I know it was in that war that the great break with the old tradition was made. The old tradition, of course, was that a ship that had fought till it could fight no longer could be surrendered to a victorious enemy without shame. The records of the wars of a century ago abound in courts-martial on officers who in these circumstances had yielded a beaten ship, and they were always honourably acquitted, when it was shown that all that was possible had been done. It was evidently thought to be mere inhumanity to condemn a crew that had fought bravely to death by fire or drowning. Not that there are not grim stories that tell of a sterner resolution, like that of Grenville in the Revenge.

But on the whole the navy that had done more fighting than any other, and in the period of its existence when its fighting was most continuous, took what is at once a rational and a Christian view of these situations. Now it seems that war at sea dooms those who have fought unfalteringly to finish the business, when they can fight no longer, by a savage self-immolation. It is the only alternative to allowing the enemy the glory of a capture. Is this, after all, an intolerable humiliation? To find it so is a break with the old tradition and is not an innovation for the better. It sets up a pagan standard, and it is not the paganism of the stoic, but the unfeeling barbarism of the Choctaw.